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ABSTRACT
DIVERSITY AS IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT
Edward H. Chang
Katherine L. Milkman
In recent years, increasing scrutiny has been placed on groups and organizations and their
levels of diversity. Because groups and organizations have incentives to avoid negative
scrutiny and often engage in attempts to manage impressions around scrutinized
behaviors, I propose that at least some organizations attend to diversity for impression
management reasons. In Chapter 1, I use Monte Carlo simulations to provide evidence
that S&P 1500 companies strategically manage the levels of gender diversity of their
boards of directors for impression management reasons. I also show that scrutiny and
visibility moderate these effects, consistent with an impression management explanation.
In Chapter 2, I draw on the idea that organizations may attend to diversity for impression
management reasons to explore a potential intervention–namely, having people make
multiple hiring or selection decisions at once as opposed to making them one at a time–to
increase gender diversity in organizations. Finally, in Chapter 3, I explore whether
organizations engage in a form of impression management I name “diversity washing,”
whereby they mislead outsiders about their actual diversity levels or practices. I find
evidence that members of certain demographic groups are systematically overrepresented
in signals of diversity of some organizations, and this appears to be moderated by
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visibility. This dissertation highlights the importance of impression management in
understanding contemporary diversity-related decisions in organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, negative scrutiny surrounding the lack of diversity in groups and
organizations in myriad contexts has increased (Lee, 2017; Merchant, 2013; Ryan, 2016).
Given that organizations have strong incentives to avoid negative scrutiny (Desai, 2011),
past research has found that organizations engage in impression management tactics
around scrutinized behaviors (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Elsbach,
Sutton, & Principe, 1998). Thus, if scrutiny surrounding diversity has increased, it is
natural to predict that organizations may now be attending to diversity for impression
management reasons.
By considering the possibility that organizations may demand diversity for
impression management reasons, I integrate theoretical perspectives to help scholarship
better understand diversity-related decisions in organizations. Taking impression
management into account can help explain phenomena like why organizations cluster at
the same levels of diversity and why individuals and organizations publicly proclaim
support for diversity in spite of lack of progress towards diversifying (Fingerhut, 2018).
In Chapter 1, in collaboration with Katherine Milkman, Dolly Chugh, and
Modupe Akinola, I provide evidence that impression management appears to drive
diversity-related hiring decisions in some organizations. Using Monte Carlo simulations,
we show that S&P 1500 boards are disproportionately likely to include exactly two
women, a phenomenon we call “twokenism.” Two women appears to be the minimum
number of women needed to meet the descriptive social norm for diversity, suggesting
1

that S&P 1500 companies are striving for the bare minimum levels of gender diversity
required to escape negative scrutiny. Consistent with this theorizing around scrutiny and
impression management, we find that more visible companies are more likely to have
exactly two women on their boards.
In Chapter 2, in collaboration with Erika Kirgios, Aneesh Rai, and Katherine
Milkman, I explore a potential intervention to increase gender diversity in organizations
that draws on the idea that people may attend to diversity for impression management
concerns. Specifically, we propose that having people make multiple hiring or selection
decisions at once–rather than making hiring or selection decisions one at a time–may lead
them to select more gender diversity in candidates. Diversity may be more salient when
selecting a group of candidates as opposed to when selecting an individual, and if people
care about diversity for impression management reasons, they should be more motivated
to avoid selecting an all-male group when diversity is more salient. In six preregistered
experiments, we show that making multiple hiring or selection decisions at once does, in
fact, increase the gender diversity of candidates selected compared to making identical
hiring or selection decisions in isolation.
In Chapter 3, I document an impression management phenomenon I call
“diversity washing,” whereby companies mislead outsiders about their actual diversity
levels or practices. In contrast to Chapter 1, which documents how impression
management shapes actual levels of diversity in organizations, Chapter 3 explores
impression management tactics organizations engage in that are completely decoupled
2

from actual diversity levels. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I show that Black people
and women of all races are systematically overrepresented on technology company and
law firm websites. Diversity washing appears to be exacerbated by increased visibility,
consistent with past research on the influence of visibility on impression management
behaviors.
Together, my dissertation explores how impression management may be a
pervasive motivation driving diversity-related decisions in organizations. In particular,
this work highlights the strength of impression management motives in guiding diversityrelated decisions in organizations and suggests that research on diversity should consider
impression management as a key motivation in theorizing and scholarship. In addition, by
painting a fuller picture of what motivates organizations to consider and strive for
diversity, I help provide insights into potential ways to increase diversity in
organizations. Past interventions to increase diversity in organizations have found
varying levels of success (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006). However, past efforts may
have been unsuccessful because they assumed that we need to change people’s biases and
prejudices, which research has shown is challenging (Lai et al., 2016). If organizations
are motivated to attend to diversity because of impression management, then that
suggests additional levers we can use to influence diversity-related decisions within
organizations that do not require changing people’s conscious or unconscious biases.
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CHAPTER 1. DIVERSITY THRESHOLDS: HOW SOCIAL NORMS,
VISIBILITY, AND SCRUTINY RELATE TO GROUP COMPOSITION
Edward H. Chang, Katherine L. Milkman, Dolly Chugh, and Modupe Akinola
Published in Academy of Management Journal in 2019
ABSTRACT
Across a field study and four experiments, we examine how social norms and scrutiny
affect decisions about adding members of underrepresented populations (e.g., women,
racial minorities) to groups. When groups are scrutinized, we theorize that decision
makers strive to match the diversity observed in peer groups due to impression
management concerns, thereby conforming to the descriptive social norm. We examine
this first in the context of U.S. corporate boards where firms face pressure to increase
gender diversity. Analyses of S&P 1500 boards reveal that significantly more boards
include exactly two women (the descriptive social norm) than would be expected by
chance. This overrepresentation of two-women boards–a phenomenon we call
“twokenism”–is more pronounced among more visible companies, consistent with our
theorizing around impression management and scrutiny. Experimental data corroborate
these findings and provide support for our theoretical mechanism: decision makers are
discontinuously less likely to add a woman to a board once it includes two women (the
social norm), and decision makers’ likelihood of adding a woman or minority to a group
is influenced by the descriptive social norms and scrutiny faced. Together, these findings
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provide a new perspective on the persistent underrepresentation of women and minorities
in organizations.
Link to Online Supplement:
https://osf.io/562yg/?view_only=1d8c31b6e5a94b0aa40ee90ac95f3f5a
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many groups have faced negative scrutiny for their lack of
diversity. For instance, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences faced backlash
in 2015 and in 2016 when all twenty actors nominated for Academy Awards in the lead
and supporting acting categories were white. This sparked an #OscarsSoWhite meme and
a plan to double female and minority membership in the Academy by 2020 (Ryan, 2016).
When Twitter made an initial public offering with no women on its board of directors in
2013, the company faced an outpouring of negative media attention, with numerous
outlets claiming that the lack of gender diversity would cause problems for the company
(Merchant, 2013; Miller, 2013). And when Donald Trump announced the members of his
presidential cabinet in 2017, the New York Times ran a front-page story tallying the
women and racial minorities Trump’s cabinet included and comparing its (lack of)
diversity to all other modern U.S. administrations (Lee, 2017). These examples illustrate
that when groups lack diversity, negative scrutiny–or critical attention paid to particular
behaviors (Sutton & Galunic, 1996)–can ensue.
Little is known, however, about when a group’s diversity will be judged
negatively or how groups will respond to the possibility of negative scrutiny regarding
their diversity. While scholarship has established that diversity is not perceived
objectively, or equivalently, by all observers and in all contexts (Unzueta & Binning,
2010, 2012; Unzueta, Knowles, & Ho, 2012), it remains ambiguous as to when group
members and those perceiving groups judge a group’s diversity to be so insufficient as to
8

warrant action or attention. Further, although past work has established that organizations
respond to reputational threats such as social movement boycotts (King, 2008;
McDonnell & King, 2013), it is unclear how those responsible for group composition
may behave when facing the threat of repercussions for displaying insufficient diversity.
In this paper, we address these questions by analyzing a decade of data on the
composition of U.S. corporate boards in the S&P 1500 and by conducting a series of
supplemental experiments.
We propose that, to avoid facing negative scrutiny, those responsible for forming
groups may seek safety in numbers by looking to the average behavior of others when
setting implicit or explicit goals about the diversity of groups. Descriptive social norms–
defined as the average observed behavior of individuals or groups in a population
(Prentice & Miller, 1993)–have been shown to serve as reference points for behavior in a
variety of contexts, setting expectations about what is appropriate and effective
(Coffman, Featherstone, & Kessler, 2014; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008;
Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008), particularly in situations
where appropriate behavior is ambiguous or uncertain (Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1936).
Decision makers and firms may thus look to relevant others to understand what the
descriptive social norms for diversity are, and they may then imitate these levels of
diversity, both because of the reputational threat associated with negative scrutiny and
because of uncertainty about what adequate diversity entails (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
This behavior should be even more prevalent among highly visible groups or
9

organizations because the negative consequences of failing to conform can be greater for
high-profile groups (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). The actions of highly visible groups
are more likely to be scrutinized in the first place (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011), and
organizations generally respond more strongly to more visible threats (King, 2008).
We combine our theorizing about descriptive social norms, scrutiny, and visibility
with past research on goal setting to make a novel prediction. Specifically, we predict that
individuals responsible for group compositions will respond to pressures to diversify in a
similar fashion, leading to an overabundance of groups with identical levels of diversity.
Past research has shown goals–like the goal to match the diversity of peer groups–are
often highly motivating (Locke & Latham, 2002), but individuals relax efforts to achieve
desirable outcomes after reaching salient goal thresholds in many settings (Heath,
Larrick, & Wu, 1999). This relaxing of effort has been shown to lead goal-seekers’
performance to cluster around salient goal thresholds (Pope & Simonsohn, 2011). We
predict this tendency will lead scrutinized groups to cluster around the social norm for
diversity set by their peers. In other words, rather than continuing to increase diversity in
response to external pressures (e.g., the threat of negative scrutiny), those with the power
to shape group diversity should be less likely to increase the diversity of a group once the
group has reached the descriptive social norm for diversity set by peers. This behavior
will lead to improbably homogeneous diversity levels across groups.
We test our theorizing first in the context of U.S. corporate boards, a setting
where firms face negative scrutiny for failing to include adequate gender diversity
10

(Merchant, 2013; Miller, 2013). Analyses of S&P 1500 boards reveal that significantly
more boards include exactly two women (the descriptive social norm) than would be
expected by chance, supporting our prediction that groups will respond to pressures to
diversify in a similar fashion, leading to an overabundance of groups with identical levels
of diversity at the descriptive social norm. This overrepresentation of two-women boards
is more pronounced among more visible companies, consistent with our theorizing
around impression management and scrutiny. In additional studies, we experimentally
manipulate descriptive social norms, scrutiny, and visibility to show that each of these
influences group diversity decisions as our theory predicts in groups besides corporate
boards and when we examine social categories besides gender.
Our work provides a more complete understanding of diversity-related hiring
decisions, telling us when women and racial minorities will be particularly attractive
candidates for inclusion in groups and when groups will reduce their efforts to increase
diversity. Further, rather than focusing only on individual-level or firm-level explanations
for why women and racial minorities may or may not be added to groups, we highlight
how external entities such as peers (who help shape descriptive social norms) and
outsider scrutiny can shape group diversity decisions. By illuminating these critical
factors that influence group diversity decisions, we provide theoretical guidance about
potential new ways to improve diversity in organizations and practical guidance to help
predict what levels of diversity we might expect to see in different contexts. Our research
suggests that it may be helpful to increase scrutiny around diversity decisions and attempt
11

to make other social norms besides descriptive social norms salient to decision makers in
order to increase the number of women and racial minorities selected into groups.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Descriptive Social Norms
Descriptive social norms–defined as the average observed behavior of individuals
or groups in a population (Prentice & Miller, 1993)–exert a potent influence on decisions.
According to past research, descriptive social norms influence the behavior of individuals
and groups for two primary reasons. First, they establish what is socially acceptable.
Because following the norm means avoiding outlier status, individuals and groups can
feel reassured that if existing norms are followed, social ostracism will not ensue
(Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). By following a descriptive
social norm, individuals and groups essentially insulate themselves from the risk of being
singled out because they are–by definition–doing what many of their peers are doing.
Individuals, groups, and organizations that negatively deviate from any descriptive norm
are much more likely to be singled out and face negative consequences (Ahmadjian &
Robinson, 2001; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012).
Second, descriptive social norms contain information about what behaviors are
likely to be effective or adaptive (Cialdini, 2007). If the majority of others have elected to
partake in a specific action or behavior (making it the descriptive social norm), then that
signals that the norm may be a wise course of action (e.g., if everyone else is using this
brand of soap, it must be a good brand of soap to use). This social information is even
12

more important when the appropriate behavior is unclear or when situations are
ambiguous or uncertain, as extant research has shown that social norms affect behavior to
a greater degree in such settings (Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1936). In effect, descriptive
social norms can function as heuristics for decision making, providing a guide for
appropriate or wise behavior in a wide range of situations.
Together, both by conveying what is appropriate and likely to be effective,
descriptive social norms produce powerful effects on judgments and decisions (Cialdini,
2003; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). A large body of empirical evidence has shown
that descriptive social norms serve as salient reference points for behavior in many
contexts, ranging from energy consumption to job acceptance decisions (Coffman et al.,
2014; Goldstein et al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2008). We propose that descriptive social
norms should influence decisions made about group diversity just as they influence
decisions in other contexts. Past research on scrutiny and impression management
illuminates why those responsible for decisions influencing group diversity may feel
pressure to follow descriptive social norms.
How Scrutiny of Group Diversity May Drive Conformity to Descriptive Social
Norms
Scrutiny refers to obtrusive and critical attention paid to particular behaviors
(Sutton & Galunic, 1996), and scrutiny can come from a variety of sources. For example,
the media is one common source of scrutiny capable of influencing an organization’s
reputation and value and shaping others’ perceptions of its legitimacy. Naturally,
13

organizations compete to receive positive and avoid negative media exposure (Fombrun,
1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Scrutiny can also come
from other sources such as shareholders (e.g., institutional investors placing pressure on
firms to engage in socially responsible behaviors) and policy makers (e.g., through
regulations and the imposition of rewards or penalties for certain behaviors; Aguilera,
Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, 2007). The public also often directly
scrutinizes organizations, mobilizing in ways that may draw wanted or unwanted
attention to particular behaviors (e.g., through social movement boycotts; McDonnell &
King, 2013).
In general, groups and organizations have strong incentives to avoid negative
scrutiny. Negative scrutiny can be detrimental for reputation and legitimacy (Desai,
2011), so in order to avoid negative scrutiny, groups frequently attempt to manage
impressions around scrutinized behaviors (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008;
Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998). Impression management describes attempts by
groups or organizations to positively shape how they are perceived (Elsbach & Sutton,
1992), and it may occur even in anticipation of the possibility of negative events. For
example, Elsbach et al. (1998) have documented how hospitals use anticipatory
impression management tactics in order to prevent potential negative scrutiny.
In recent years, scrutiny has increased surrounding the diversity of groups. For
example, the media has scrutinized companies for insufficient gender diversity on their
boards of directors (Merchant, 2013; Miller, 2013); presidents for insufficient race and
14

gender diversity in their cabinets (Lee, 2017) and their U.S. Supreme Court nominees
(Totenberg, 2016); and the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences for insufficient
racial diversity among their Oscar nominees (Buckley, 2016; Ryan, 2016). Importantly,
scrutiny is often applied selectively: rather than simultaneously emphasizing racial,
gender, and socio-economic diversity, for instance, scrutiny often focuses more narrowly
on a single dimension of diversity. For example, while groups such as corporate boards
have faced considerable negative scrutiny for a lack of gender diversity, there has been
far less attention to their lack of racial diversity.
Scrutiny surrounding diversity naturally motivates impression management
concerns. An important question, then, is how decision makers who shape the
composition of high profile groups within organizations may seek to manage diversity in
order to avoid negative scrutiny. We propose that past research on descriptive social
norms provides key insights. If groups or organizations are motivated to avoid negative
scrutiny, then following the descriptive social norm for diversity essentially ensures that
they will not be singled out for inadequate diversity. Further, because it is often unclear
what an “objective” benchmark for strong performance should be in the context of
decisions around diversity (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Shemla, Meyer, Greer, & Jehn,
2014; Unzueta et al., 2012), descriptive social norms should be particularly informative
in guiding behavior around diversity. Thus, groups and organizations (and the decision
makers responsible for their composition) may treat the descriptive social norm for
diversity as a goal for impression management reasons.
15

The Implications of Descriptive Social Norms as Diversity Goals
Past research on goal setting offers insight into what will happen when those who
shape group composition share the same explicit or implicit goal. Goals serve as
reference points, causing individuals to expend considerable effort in the hopes of
achieving an unmet goal and then to relax their efforts after achieving it (Heath et al.,
1999; Locke & Latham, 2002). This has been shown to lead to performance clustering
around salient goal thresholds in numerous contexts. For instance, professional baseball
players finish seasons disproportionately often with a batting average just above .300 (a
salient threshold widely believed to separate good hitters from great ones; Moskowitz &
Wertheim, 2011; Pope & Simonsohn, 2011), and marathon runners finish races
disproportionately often in the minute right before salient, round number thresholds (e.g.,
the minute just under three hours; Allen et al., 2016). We therefore expect to observe an
excess mass or clustering of groups at (or just above) the descriptive social norm for
diversity.1
Hypothesis 1a. Groups’ diversity levels will cluster at (or just above) the
descriptive social norm set by peers for diversity.
While Hypothesis 1a pertains to group composition, group composition is the
result of decisions regarding which members to add to a group. If reaching the descriptive

1

Because descriptive social norms are averages, they are rarely whole numbers (e.g., the
average number of women per board was 1.36 women in the S&P 1500 in 2013). Since
groups cannot have fractional numbers of women or racial minorities, we expect
clustering at “or just above” the descriptive social norm (i.e. at the smallest whole
number above the descriptive social norm).
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social norm for diversity is a goal of those who shape group compositions, then efforts to
increase group diversity (in the form of adding underrepresented group members) should
decline precipitously once the descriptive social norm for diversity is achieved.
Empirically, this relaxing of effort after reaching a goal threshold has been observed in
several contexts. In the context of baseball, as just mentioned, batters and their teams
reduce their at bat appearances near the end of the season once they have exceeded the
salient .300 batting average threshold that separates good hitters from great ones (Pope &
Simonsohn, 2011). In the context of SAT scores, students are disproportionately less
likely to retake the SAT once they surpass a salient threshold such as a score of 1000 (the
average score set by the College Board and a salient round number; Pope & Simonsohn,
2011). In our context of diversity and group composition decisions, we predict that
groups are less likely to increase their diversity once they have already reached the
descriptive social norm for diversity established by peers.
Hypothesis 1b. Groups (and the individuals who shape their composition) will
add new members from underrepresented populations at a lower rate once they have
surpassed the pertinent descriptive social norm for diversity.
Importantly, we only expect descriptive social norms to serve as goals when it
comes to scrutinized dimensions of diversity. Without any scrutiny on a given dimension
of diversity, there should be no impression management motives and thus no desire to
follow the descriptive social norm. For example, we would expect to find support for
Hypotheses 1a and 1b when it comes to gender diversity in settings where inadequate
17

gender diversity has been scrutinized (e.g., on corporate boards) but not in settings where
gender diversity has not been scrutinized. Thus, we propose that scrutiny (or the threat of
negative scrutiny) is required in order to produce our hypothesized clustering and
threshold effects.
Hypothesis 2. Scrutiny moderates the effects of descriptive social norms on group
diversity decisions. Specifically, descriptive social norms will only influence group
diversity decisions and outcomes when scrutiny is present along a given diversity
dimension.
The Moderating Role of Visibility
If groups and organizations manage impressions around diversity to avoid
negative scrutiny, this tendency should be more pronounced among more visible groups
and organizations. We follow past research and use the term “visibility” to describe how
much attention individuals, groups, or organizations typically receive (Chiu & Sharfman,
2011), regardless of why they are receiving this attention (as opposed to our use of the
term “scrutiny”, which refers to attention paid to a particular behavior such as a group’s
gender diversity). When firms are more visible (e.g., because they operate in more visible
industries or because they have higher overall media exposure), they face greater external
pressures to engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviors (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) and
are also more likely to engage in legitimacy-enhancing behaviors like corporate social
performance initiatives (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011). For example, firms respond more to
boycotts when they receive more media attention (King, 2008), and firms engage in more
18

prosocial activities when boycotts are more threatening because of increased media
attention (McDonnell & King, 2013). Past research has shown that conforming to
descriptive social norms (i.e. mimicking the behavior of peer firms) is one way to
enhance legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), suggesting that descriptive social norms
should influence the diversity of groups along scrutinized diversity dimensions to a
greater degree when those groups are more visible. Further, the actions of more visible
firms receive more attention, which can magnify the negative consequences of failing to
conform to social norms.
Past research on individual judgment and decision making makes similar
predictions regarding the effects of visibility on conformity to descriptive social norms.
Social norms influence behavior to a greater degree when individuals and their behaviors
are more visible (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). In particular, individuals tend to look to social
norms to guide their behavior most frequently when the behavior in question is public or
observable (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren, Reno, &
Cialdini, 2000; Shaffer, 1983). For example, studies have found that monitoring
employees can improve conformity to ethical norms in the context of employee theft
(Pierce, Snow, & McAfee, 2015), monitoring can improve conformity to hand hygiene
norms in hospitals (Staats, Dai, Hofmann, & Milkman, 2016), and being in a public
setting (as opposed to a private setting) can make women more likely to conform to
gender norms regarding assertiveness (Swim & Hyers, 1999). On an individual level, we
would thus expect more conformity to descriptive social norms when outcomes are more
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visible. Thus, research and theorizing on both individuals and firms suggests more visible
groups should be more likely to conform to social norms around diversity along
scrutinized diversity dimensions.
Hypothesis 3. Visibility moderates the effects of descriptive social norms on group
diversity decisions along scrutinized diversity dimensions. Specifically, more visible
groups will be more likely to follow the descriptive social norm for diversity along
scrutinized diversity dimensions than less visible groups.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We begin by examining our
hypotheses in the field, exploring whether they make accurate predictions about the
composition and evolution of U.S. corporate boards. In Study 1A, we present analyses of
S&P 1500 board composition data from 2013 that test for excess clustering of corporate
boards at the descriptive social norm for gender diversity (Hypothesis 1a). We also
examine whether this pattern is more extreme among more visible companies
(Hypothesis 3). In Study 1B, we present analyses of board member additions to
determine whether boards are discontinuously less likely to add female directors once
they have reached the descriptive social norm for gender diversity (Hypothesis 1b). In
Study 1C, we run an online experiment to test for evidence of the same pattern of
discontinuities in board member selection found in the field in Study 1B in a stylized
hypothetical decision environment where we can randomize the number of women on a
board and control for the availability of qualified candidates (Hypothesis 1b). In Studies
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2A and 2B, we seek evidence that scrutiny, descriptive social norms about diversity, and
goal thresholds influence the gender of group members selected for empty positions, and
we experimentally manipulate social norms and scrutiny to test Hypotheses 1b and 2.
Finally, in Study 3, we examine how social norms and group visibility affect the race of
group members selected for empty positions, and we do this by experimentally
manipulating social norms and visibility to test Hypotheses 1b and 3. Together, these
studies help establish the external validity, internal validity, and generalizability of our
theories.
STUDY 1: CORPORATE BOARDS
We first test our theories in the context of U.S. corporate boards. This is an
important organizational setting that is economically significant, as boards control
trillions of dollars. It is also highly policy relevant, as in recent years, numerous countries
have passed laws about the gender composition of the corporate boards of public
companies (Bainbridge & Henderson, 2014; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Smale & Miller,
2015).
Study 1A: Clustering of U.S. Corporate Board Compositions at the Social Norm
In Study 1A, we analyzed the most recent available S&P 1500 corporate board
composition data (from 2013) to test whether descriptive social norms influence board
composition. Given the importance of scrutiny to our theoretical model (see Hypothesis
2), we first sought to establish which dimensions of corporate board diversity faced
scrutiny at the time of data collection. An analysis of news articles from 2013 in the news
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database Lexis Nexis revealed that of 98 newspaper articles that mentioned “board
diversity”, 97% mentioned gender diversity, while 18% mentioned racial or ethnic
diversity (the second most frequently mentioned social category). In addition, several
countries in Europe have recently passed laws mandating minimum levels of gender
diversity on the boards of public companies under their jurisdiction (Smale & Miller,
2015), but no such laws have been passed about other types of diversity. Given that the
majority of attention regarding diversity on corporate boards focuses on gender diversity,
in this study, we therefore test for (and only expect to observe) social norm effects
pertaining to the gender diversity of U.S. corporate boards.
On S&P 1500 corporate boards, the average number of women was 1.36 in 2013,
and this descriptive social norm received significant media coverage, with all newspaper
articles in the Lexis Nexis database about board gender diversity in 2013 focusing on the
average number or percentage of women on boards. We therefore expect to observe an
excess of boards with exactly two women, as boards with two women just exceed the
peer norm for gender diversity (Hypothesis 1a). We also predict that this excess of
exactly two women per board will be more prevalent among more visible companies–
those that receive more overall media attention (Hypothesis 3).
Methods
Data. Our dataset was compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The
ISS Directors Data we analyzed contains detailed information about the boards of
directors for 1,514 companies that represent the S&P Composite 1500, which is
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composed of three indices: the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap
600. The S&P 1500 represents roughly 90% of the total U.S. stock market capitalization,
and we also focus on the far more visible subset of companies in the S&P 500,2 which
represents roughly 90% of the total market capitalization of the S&P 1500 and 80% of
the total market capitalization of the U.S. stock market (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2015).
The ISS dataset we analyze includes information on the individual members of
the boards of directors for each of the 1,514 companies in the S&P Composite 1500,
including each director’s name, gender, and ethnicity.3 The dataset is updated annually,
and for our primary analysis, we relied on the 2013 data, as this was the most recent data
available to us as of June 5, 2015 when we first accessed the ISS database.
Additional data were collected on each company’s media mentions (from Lexis
Nexis), industry (from NASDAQ), year of IPO (from Bloomberg and company
websites), market capitalization (from the Center for Research in Security Prices and
Google Finance), and percent institutional ownership (from Bloomberg), and these data
were used to perform robustness checks and investigate the moderating effect of
visibility.

2

A Google search for the term “S&P 500” returns 400 times as many results as a Google
search for the term “S&P 1500”, and a Google Scholar search for the term “S&P 500”
returns 20 times as many articles as a search for the term “S&P 1500”.
3
ISS data on director gender was complete, but in 31 instances, director ethnicity was
missing or blank. We manually searched Google and company websites to fill in these
missing data.
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Analysis Strategy. To test Hypothesis 1a, we relied on a comparison of the actual
distribution of male and female directors on corporate boards with the distribution we
would expect if those directors were assigned to boards in a gender-neutral manner. We
determined the expected distribution using a Monte Carlo simulation method (Rubinstein
& Kroese, 2011). Specifically, we took existing 2013 S&P 1500 and S&P 500 data on
directors and board seats from the ISS Directors dataset and then randomly reassigned
directors to different boards, generating 10,000 simulated distributions of directors to
boards. Because we randomly reassigned actual directors to boards in each of our
simulations, these simulations produced the board composition distribution we would
expect to see if gender played no role in board member selection. In other words, given
the available pool of board seats and directors, our simulations told us how many women
we should expect to see on each board if boards ignored gender when selecting board
members.
We reassign existing directors in our simulations to provide a conservative test of
whether there exist anomalous sorting patterns of female directors to boards.4 In each

One common explanation for the limited number of women on corporate boards is that
there are not enough qualified women to serve on boards. We thus assume the universe of
people qualified to serve on boards consists only of those who actually sit on boards, so
our simulations gauge whether we find anomalous sorting even if we assume no more
qualified women exist to serve on boards. This extremely conservative assumption is
certainly incorrect, but given that the universe of qualified women must be larger than the
set who already serve on boards, finding evidence of clustering at the social norm under
our assumptions would be even more remarkable (since relaxing this assumption would
make it easier for the observed gender distribution to deviate from our simulated
expected distribution).
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simulation, we took as given the number of boards, the size of each board, and the
number of board seats each director held based on the statistics we observed in the 2013
ISS Directors Dataset. For example, if company Alpha had nine board members in the
ISS Directors Dataset, then in each simulation, company Alpha was assigned nine distinct
board members. Similarly, if director Zed held two different board seats in the ISS
Directors Dataset, then director Zed ended each simulation holding seats on two different
corporate boards.
Running this simulation 10,000 times produced random assignments of all
directors to all boards that reflected the same number of directors, number of boards, and
the same board sizes we observed in the ISS Directors Dataset. For each simulation
result, we considered how many company boards were assigned zero female directors,
one female director, two female directors, etc. We then calculated the mean of these
values across all 10,000 simulations. These means told us how many companies we
would expect, on average, to observe with exactly zero, one, two, and so on female
directors if available board seats in the ISS dataset were randomly assigned to available
directors. Our simulations also told us how rare a given assortment was, giving us bounds
in the form of confidence intervals around each mean to indicate the likelihood under
random assignment that we would observe a certain fraction of boards containing a
specific number of women (e.g., in what fraction of 10,000 simulations had we obtained
such a result).
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Although this simulation strategy has been used and validated in a number of
empirical papers (e.g., Dezső, Ross, & Uribe, 2016; Gino & Pierce, 2010), we also
conducted placebo simulations with a characteristic other than gender to ensure that any
observed deviations from our simulations on gender were not an artifact of our simulation
method (see Robustness Checks).
Results
Summary Statistics. For companies in our dataset, the modal number of directors
on a board was nine, the median number was nine, and 95% of companies had between 6
and 14 directors. Because we were interested in understanding the distribution of the
absolute number of women on each board, boards with outlier numbers of seats could
have exerted undue influence on our analyses. For our primary analyses, we therefore
trimmed our dataset to include only companies with a total number of directors in the
middle 95% of the distribution, excluding companies with outlier numbers of directors
(i.e. fewer than six or more than 14) and leaving us with 1,441 companies to analyze.
However, the results of our analyses remain meaningfully unchanged in terms of
magnitude and statistical significance if we repeat them without trimming these outliers
(see Online Supplement).
The 1,441 companies in our trimmed data set included 13,440 distinct board seats
and 11,185 distinct directors, as some directors held board seats on multiple company
boards. In our trimmed dataset, 84% of directors held exactly one board seat; 13% held
two board seats; 3% held three board seats; and less than 1% held four or five board
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seats. Of the 11,185 unique directors represented in our trimmed dataset, 14% (1,558)
were female, and women held 15% (1,963) of the available board seats (see Table 1).
Ninety-one percent (N = 10,150) of directors were Caucasian, 3.7% (N = 417) were
Black, 3.0% (N = 335) were Asian, 1.7% (N = 192) were Hispanic, and 0.8% (N = 91)
were classified as belonging to a different ethnic group (see Table 1). The average age of
the directors in our trimmed dataset was 62.9 years with a standard deviation of 8.9 years.
Fifty-eight (4.0%) of the companies had female CEOs. See Table 2 for a correlation
matrix describing our data.
Do Boards Cluster Around the Descriptive Social Norm for Gender Diversity?
Hypothesis 1a suggests we should find an excess of boards with exactly two women
(since the relevant descriptive social norm was that an average board in the S&P 1500
included 1.36 women in 2013 and an average board in the S&P 500 included 1.89 women
in 2013). Based on simulations of the S&P 1500, there were 8% fewer companies with no
women than would be expected (p < 0.02), and consistent with Hypothesis 1a, there were
12% more boards with exactly two women than would be expected (p < 0.01). Boards
including other frequencies of women were in line with expectations (see Figure 1, Panel
A). Similarly, for the S&P 500 and consistent with Hypothesis 1a, there were 45% more
companies with exactly two female board members than would be expected (p < 0.001).
There were also 45% fewer companies with no female board members than we would
expect (p < 0.001), and boards including other frequencies of women again arose at the
rate expected (see Figure 1, Panel B). Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported, and in light of
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the far higher visibility of S&P 500 companies than other companies in the S&P 1500,
these patterns provide suggestive evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.
To provide further support for Hypothesis 1a, we analyzed additional historical
data on corporate board composition to assess whether historical descriptive social norms
also determined where clustering occurred. In years when the average number of women
per board (i.e. the descriptive social norm) was below one woman, our theorizing predicts
an overrepresentation of boards with exactly one woman (i.e. “tokenism” or a group
including exactly one woman (Kanter, 1977)); in years when the average number of
women per board was between one and two women (e.g., 1.36 women per board in
2013), our theorizing predicts an overrepresentation of boards with exactly two women.
We name the phenomenon whereby a group includes exactly two women “twokenism”,
which is a portmanteau of the number “two” and the term “tokenism” originally used by
Kanter (1977). We repeated our simulations using twelve years of historical data to see if
the descriptive social norm did in fact predict where an excess of boards arose in each
distribution.
We gathered additional data on the composition of S&P 1500 boards from 2002
to 2012 from the RiskMetrics Directors Legacy dataset (for the years 2002 to 2006)5 and

5

Data captured prior to 2002 in the RiskMetrics Directors Legacy dataset appear to have
substantial variation in data quality and reliability. For example, although the dataset is
meant to include information about S&P 1500 companies, and there are roughly 1500
companies in the S&P 1500, the 2001 dataset included information about 1797
companies supposedly in the S&P 1500, suggesting it was unreliable. This is why we
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the ISS (RiskMetrics) Directors dataset (for the years 2007 to 2012) on August 22, 2016.
For each year from 2002 to 2012, we repeated our simulation strategy to calculate how
many boards would be expected to include exactly one or exactly two female directors
and then compared these simulation-based expectations to the number of boards we
actually observed with exactly one or exactly two female directors.
As illustrated in Figure 2, we found a statistically significant overrepresentation of
boards with exactly one woman when the descriptive social norm was below one woman
per board and statistically significant overrepresentation of boards with exactly two
women when the descriptive social norm rose above one woman per board. In 2002 and
2003, the descriptive social norm for gender diversity–or the average number of women
per board–was less than one woman, and we see statistically significant tokenism in these
two years, but we do not find statistically significant twokenism in these years. From
2005 to 2013, the descriptive social norm for gender diversity exceeded one woman, and
we see statistically significant twokenism in these years, but we do not find statistically
significant tokenism in these years, however. In 2004, the first year that the descriptive
social norm for gender diversity exceeded one woman in the S&P 1500, we still observe
statistically significant tokenism and do not yet find statistically significant twokenism.
When we ran an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level to predict the extent of tokenism (or the overrepresentation of

began our analyses with data from 2002. ISS Director data is only available going back to
2007.
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boards including one woman) or twokenism (or the overrepresentation of boards
including two women) in each year as a function of whether the descriptive social norm
for gender diversity exceeded one woman in that year, we found that the descriptive
social norm exceeding one woman was a significant negative predictor of tokenism (β = 0.11; p < 0.001) and a significant positive predictor of twokenism (β = 0.12; p = 0.002).
This provides further support for Hypothesis 1a and our theorizing that descriptive social
norms help determine salient thresholds for diversity.
Are More Visible Companies More Likely to Exhibit Twokenism? To test
Hypothesis 3 in this context, we examined whether companies that receive more media
attention were more likely to include exactly two women on their boards. We used media
attention as a proxy for visibility to align with past research on organizational visibility
(Brammer & Millington, 2006; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; King, 2008; McDonnell & King,
2013). We searched Lexis Nexis for all media mentions (including newspapers, webbased publications, magazines, etc.) of each of the companies in the S&P 1500 in 2012
(mean media mentions of a company = 307; S.D. = 441). We gathered 2012 data on
media attention so we could examine whether past media attention predicted future
(2013) twokenism. We then analyzed whether media attention in 2012 predicted whether
companies would include exactly two women on their boards in 2013.
We ordered the companies in our dataset by the number of media mentions each
company received in 2012 and created deciles (i.e. ten bins of 144 companies each) based
on this ordering. Thus, the first decile contained the companies most frequently
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mentioned in the media in 2012, while the last decile contained the companies least
frequently mentioned in the media in 2012. After segmenting the companies in our
dataset by the amount of media attention they were subjected to in 2012, we repeated our
basic simulation strategy but limited each simulation to include only the companies in a
given decile. This allowed us to determine how many companies we would expect to see
with exactly two women on their boards in 2013 in each of the deciles. We ran 1,000
simulations for each decile, generating a new expected number of companies with exactly
two female directors each time. Thus, for each decile, we generated an expected number
of companies with exactly two women on their boards based on our simulations, and we
could compare this with the actual number of companies including exactly two women
on their boards in our 2013 board data.
The results of our simulations for the different media attention deciles are
depicted in Figure 3. To test the hypothesis that the likelihood of having exactly two
women on a company’s board increases for more visible companies, we ran an ordinary
least squared (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. We used the logarithm of the
average number of media mentions in a given decile to predict the absolute difference
between the observed and expected number of companies with exactly two women on
their boards in each decile. The logarithm of media mentions of the decile was a
significant predictor of the absolute difference between observed and expected boards
with exactly two female directors (β = 6.12, p = 0.014). The positive coefficient of log
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media mentions indicates that deciles containing more visible companies were more
likely to display twokenism, supporting Hypothesis 3.6
Robustness Checks. To further validate our simulation strategy and ensure our
results were not an artifact of the way we constructed an expected distribution of the
number of boards including varying numbers of female directors, we conducted a series
of placebo simulations (Gino & Pierce, 2010). Specifically, in these placebo simulations,
we produced expected distributions of the number of boards that would include varying
numbers of directors with another characteristic (i.e., not gender) that should not show
goal-related clustering effects because of a lack of scrutiny on that characteristic (e.g.,
board members whose ages ended with an arbitrary number). We found no significant
differences between the expected numbers of boards and the actual numbers of boards in
any of our placebo simulations, suggesting that the large deviations we see in our
simulations studying gender were not an artifact of the way we constructed our baseline
expectations or null distributions (see the Online Supplement for complete details about
our placebo simulations).
In addition to conducting placebo simulations to ensure the robustness of our
simulation methodology, we conducted numerous additional robustness checks to ensure

6

See the Online Supplement for additional specifications of this regression to test the
robustness of this finding and for a table reporting detailed regression results. We used as
predictors either the logarithm of the average number of media mentions or the decile
rank, and we used as outcomes either the absolute overrepresentation of boards with
exactly two women or the percent overrepresentation of boards with exactly two women.
All yielded findings that were statistically significant and meaningfully unchanged.
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our results were not driven by outliers or by a small subset of boards by repeating our
baseline simulations with different cuts of our data. First, we checked that our findings
were robust to board size. To do this, we used our standard simulation strategy but
limited the data to boards of size 6 or fewer, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 or more. The
underrepresentation of companies with no women on their boards and the
overrepresentation of companies with exactly two women on their boards is robust across
all board sizes tested (see Table 3), although the clustering at the social norm of two is
largely driven by companies with larger boards, and future research exploring the reasons
for this could yield interesting insights.
Our results are also robust across industries, and they hold regardless of the
gender of a company’s CEO (see Online Supplement). We also examined whether the
length of time the company has been public affects the likelihood that the company has
exactly two women on its board. In general, our results appear to be robust regardless of
when a company went public (see Online Supplement). Finally, when we examine how
our results relate to the market capitalization of a company, we find that twokenism is
more prevalent among companies with higher market capitalization (see Online
Supplement), which are also the most frequently mentioned by the media (the correlation
between the logarithm of a company’s market capitalization and the logarithm of its
number of media mentions in 2013 = 0.59; p < 0.001).
Study 1B: Threshold Effects in Board Member Selection at the Social Norm
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In Study 1B, we analyzed the gender of new board members added to company
boards over time for evidence consistent with our theories. We predicted that boards
would be discontinuously less likely to add additional women once they had met the
relevant descriptive social norm for gender diversity (Hypothesis 1b). Given that the
descriptive social norm for gender diversity in the S&P 1500 first surpassed one woman
in 2004, we examine all board member additions from 2004 to 2013 to test whether
boards during this time period were discontinuously less likely to add additional female
directors once they already included two women on their boards.
Method
Data. For these analyses, we use a subset of the data described in Study 1a.
Specifically, we use the ISS Directors dataset describing board composition from 2007 to
2013 and the RiskMetrics Directors Legacy dataset describing board composition from
2004 to 2006 to examine the 9,989 board member additions in the S&P 1500 from 2004
to 2013.
Analysis Strategy. Using data on all board member additions from 2004 to 2013,
we estimated an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to predict
whether each newly added board member was female.7 We included as predictors both
the number of women currently on a board (to control for the possibility that boards have

7

We rely on a linear model because it yields more interpretable coefficients than a logit
specification, and this method also allows us to correct for heteroskedasticity in the
standard errors (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; see Brands & Fernandez-Mateo, 2016 for a
similar procedure). However, logistic regressions yield similar results and are reported in
the Online Supplement.
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either increasing or decreasing marginal value for female directors) as well as an
indicator for whether the board included at least two women (our primary predictor of a
discontinuity in a groups’ desire to add more women after exceeding the social norm for
gender diversity), and we clustered standard errors by firm. We report these regressions
with and without fixed effects for board size, fixed effects for industry, fixed effects for
stock market index, and a continuous control for a company’s market capitalization.
Results
Summary Statistics. Of the 9,989 board additions from 2004 to 2013, 16.5%
(1,649) were additions of female directors. The 9,989 board member additions from 2004
to 2013 represent 8,328 distinct directors (i.e. some directors were added to multiple
boards during this time period), and 16.2% (1,347) of the distinct directors were female.
On average, boards in this dataset added 5.25 directors during this nine-year span.
Do Boards Add Fewer Women Once They Have Reached the Descriptive Social
Norm? As shown in Table 4, Model 1, for the S&P 1500, the coefficient on our primary
predictor of whether a board added a female director–an indicator for whether the board
already included at least two women–was negative and significant in our primary
regression specification (β = -0.039; p = 0.017). As shown in Table 4, Model 3, for the
S&P 500 (roughly the 500 most visible and valuable companies in the S&P 1500), the
coefficient on the indicator variable was negative and even more highly significant (β = 0.092; p < 0.001). This suggests that companies are less likely to add additional women
to their boards once their boards have met the social norm for gender diversity by
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including two women, providing support for Hypothesis 1b. The larger effect size in the
(highly visible) S&P 500 also provides some suggestive support for Hypothesis 3.
Adding in fixed effects for board size, fixed effects for industry, fixed effects for stock
market index, and a continuous control for market capitalization (see Table 4, Models 2
and 4), we still find that our predictor of a discontinuity is significant in the S&P 1500 (β
= -0.034; p = 0.037) and in the S&P 500 (β = -0.090; p < 0.001).
Do More Visible Companies Show Larger Discontinuities at the Descriptive
Social Norm? To test Hypothesis 3 in Study 1B, we examined whether there was an
interaction between media attention and our primary predictor of whether a board added a
female director–an indicator for whether the board already included at least two women.
We again searched Lexis Nexis for all media mentions of each of the companies in the
S&P 1500, and we gathered additional data to look at media mentions for each year
starting in 2004 to see if media attention in year t – 1 predicted whether a newly added
board member in year t was female. For our analyses, we used the centered logarithm of
media mentions rather than the raw number of media mentions because the distribution of
media mentions is highly skewed (skewness = 2.57; skewness test for normality p <
0.0001; kurtosis = 10.37; kurtosis test for normality p < 0.0001).
Our results are depicted in Table 5. As predicted, we find a significant negative
interaction between the centered logarithm of the number of media mentions in year t – 1
and having two or more women on a board in predicting whether a newly added board
member in year t was female (β = -0.021; p = 0.042; Model 1). Adding in fixed effects
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for board size, fixed effects for industry, fixed effects for stock market index, and a
continuous control for market capitalization, we still find a significant negative
interaction between the centered logarithm of media mentions and having two or more
women (β = -0.021; p = 0.041; Model 2). These results suggest that more visible
companies show larger discontinuities in board member additions at the descriptive social
norm of two women per board.
Study 1C: Online Experiment Replicating Threshold Effects
In Study 1C, we sought to replicate our findings regarding threshold effects from
Study 1B in an online experiment that allowed us to randomly assign the number of
women in a group and control for the availability of qualified candidates. Specifically, we
investigated whether individuals in a controlled setting are less likely to add women to a
corporate board when the board has met or surpassed the social norm for gender diversity
by including two or more women.
Method
Participants. Four hundred and seventy-nine U.S. participants were recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in a short online research study (55%
male; 77% Caucasian). These participants were paid $0.25 for completing a survey they
were told would take approximately 5 minutes of their time. Sample size was determined
a priori, data analysis was conducted only once all data were collected, and we do not
exclude any data.
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Procedures. In a pilot study (see the Online Supplement for details), we first
established that our study population was indeed aware that two is the average number of
women on U.S. corporate boards (i.e. two women is the descriptive social norm for
gender diversity).
After establishing an awareness of descriptive social norms in a pilot, we ran our
primary study. In this study, participants were asked to imagine they had been tasked
with helping a company select a new member for its board of directors. They were then
exposed to a list of ten names and told the current board consisted of the individuals on
that list. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions
where zero, one, two, or three of the names of board members were female.
Study participants were next presented with three hypothetical candidates for an
opening on the board in question and asked to choose one to add to the board. The
candidates were all described as qualified, but one was a CEO, one was a current board
member at another company, and one was a consultant with expertise in the industry. We
randomly varied which candidate had a female name (Jill Davis) and which candidates
had male names (Matthew Anderson and Todd Miller), and we randomly varied which
name was associated with each qualification.8 We presented three candidates for the
available board seat rather than one male and one female to reduce suspicion that our
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Participants were most likely to choose the candidate who was a CEO (p < 0.001),
regardless of gender. However, because we randomly assigned qualifications to the
candidates, we do not need to control for candidate qualification in order for our tests to
provide unbiased estimates of the causal effects of our manipulations. In addition, we did
not find any significant interactions between gender and candidate qualifications.
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study was about gender following Castilla and Benard (2010). Our dependent variable of
interest was what fraction of participants in each condition would choose a female
candidate.
Finally, participants completed demographic questions and a manipulation check
question, which asked them to recall how many men and how many women were present
on the corporate board they had seen at the beginning of the survey. Study materials and
a correlation matrix of all variables collected in this study are available in the Online
Supplement.
Results
First, our manipulation check confirmed our manipulation was successful:
participants recalled significantly more women on boards that included three women than
two (p < 0.001), two women than one (p < 0.001), and one woman than zero women (p =
0.015).
Second, a Chi-square test of independence showed a marginally significant
relationship between the number of women on the board and whether the participant
chose the female candidate (χ2(3, N = 479) = 7.51, p = 0.057). Consistent with
Hypothesis 1b and replicating our results from Study 1B, participants were significantly
less likely to choose the female candidate and increase the gender diversity of the board
once the board included at least two women. Participants shown a corporate board with
exactly two female members were significantly less likely to choose the female candidate
for the open seat (M = 36.0%, SD = 0.482) than were participants who were shown a
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corporate board with one female member (M = 50.4%, SD = 0.502; t(239) = 2.27, p =
0.024; see Figure 4).9 We then ran an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with robust
standard errors to predict the likelihood a participant chose the female candidate,
replicating our empirical analyses of board member additions from S&P 1500 and S&P
500 data from Study 1B. We again included the number of women currently on the board
as a control variable in addition to an indicator variable for whether the board included at
least two women as a predictor of a discontinuity. The coefficient on the indicator
variable was negative and marginally significant (β = -0.187, p = 0.062; see Table 6),
suggesting that participants in our experiment also were discontinuously less likely to
increase the gender diversity of the board once the board had at least two women and
providing additional support for Hypothesis 1b.
Discussion
Study 1A shows that U.S. corporate boards are disproportionately likely to
include exactly the number of women needed to minimally exceed the descriptive social
norm for female representation in peer groups. This evidence is consistent with
Hypothesis 1a, which proposes that the composition of groups facing scrutiny along a
diversity dimension will cluster around the descriptive social norm for that type of
diversity. Further, historical analyses show that descriptive social norms predicted the
shift from tokenism (an overabundance of boards with exactly one female director) to
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We find a main effect of participant gender such that female participants are
significantly more likely to select the female candidate (p = 0.019), but we find no
significant interaction between participant gender and decisions.
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twokenism (an overabundance of boards with exactly two female directors), providing
additional support for Hypothesis 1a that the clustering we detect is driven by the
descriptive social norm for gender diversity.
Study 1B provides support for Hypothesis 1b, which states that groups facing
scrutiny along a diversity dimension will be less likely to add members of the relevant
underrepresented group once they have reached the descriptive social norm for diversity.
We find that U.S. corporate boards are discontinuously less likely to add additional
women once they have reached the descriptive social norm for diversity by including two
female directors. In Study 1C, we replicate this finding in a stylized experiment where we
randomly assign the number of women to a hypothetical corporate board and control for
the availability of qualified candidates. While Study 1C lacks the realism of Studies 1A
and 1B, it confirms our hypothesis in an environment where we can randomly assign
board composition, providing convergent evidence that there exists a causal relationship
between board composition and the gender of new board members.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicts scrutiny is a necessary condition for
social norms to influence diversity, we do not see evidence of clustering at the social
norm when we look at board members’ race or ethnicity in supplemental analyses.10
There is far less scrutiny of corporate boards’ racial diversity compared with the scrutiny
boards face regarding gender diversity (i.e., only 18% of news articles about board

10

A more detailed discussion of simulation analyses regarding director race and ethnicity
can be found in the Online Supplement.
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diversity in 2013 discussed racial diversity while 97% discussed gender diversity, and no
laws have been passed establishing racial quotas on corporate boards in any country), so
corporate boards may have fewer impression management motives regarding the
recruitment of racial or ethnic minorities compared to women.
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find evidence that more visible
companies (as measured by media coverage in the previous year) are more likely to
include exactly two women on their boards, consistent with our theory that the clustering
we detect at the social norm is driven in part by impression management concerns. In
Study 1B, we also find that more visible companies show larger discontinuities at the
descriptive social norm of two women per board when adding additional female board
members.
Past research suggests these findings are worrisome from a policy perspective.
Research on the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards suggests that at least
three female directors are needed before boards experience tangible benefits from gender
diversity (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008; Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011). By stopping
at two women, boards may be missing out on key benefits that can ensue from greater
gender diversity (cf. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Matsa & Miller, 2013). Further, our results
suggest that the push for gender parity on boards may not generate results for a long time.
In Study 1A, we depict the evolution of descriptive social norms regarding gender
diversity on corporate boards over a twelve-year span, and these results suggest that
descriptive social norms change quite slowly over time.
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In spite of the compelling evidence provided by our empirical analyses of archival
board composition data supporting our theorizing and hypotheses, Studies 1A and 1B are
ultimately only correlational studies and thus have limitations. We cannot completely rule
out concerns about reverse causality or other confounds such as firm performance. In
addition, because we do not observe board member selection decisions directly, we can
only explore the mechanisms responsible for the effects we have documented indirectly.
There are many factors at play that affect who is added to corporate boards (e.g., legal
constraints can prevent people from serving on multiple boards; bias and stereotyping
may affect board member selection), and we focus only on the roles played by descriptive
social norms, scrutiny, and visibility. We also unfortunately cannot disentangle the
specific motives of individual companies.
In order to provide more confidence in our results, in Study 1C, we replicated
threshold effects at the descriptive social norm in an experimental setting where we could
randomize the number of women in a group. This gives us greater confidence that the
results found in Study 1B are not driven by endogeneity or the fact that there are not
enough qualified women for director positions. However, we acknowledge that Study 1C
is a stylized experiment that does not accurately represent corporate board decisionmaking processes. First, our experiment is conducted at the level of the individual, while
boards are groups. Second, board members have much more experience and many more
constraints they must attend to, while we use a relatively uninformed sample and
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intentionally stripped away many of the complications of the board member selection
process for simplicity.
In spite of these limitations, these studies collectively provide empirical evidence
that group composition and group diversity decisions can be affected by threshold effects
at the descriptive social norm. In our following studies, we provide additional
experimental evidence directly testing our theoretical model to examine the influences of
descriptive social norms, scrutiny, and visibility on group diversity decisions.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we sought to test our theoretical model more directly by
manipulating–rather than measuring–the descriptive social norms and scrutiny associated
with the inclusion of females in a group. In addition, we sought to explore these
phenomena in a new setting to establish their generalizability to groups besides corporate
boards.
Study 2A: Group Diversity, Social Norms and Scrutiny
In Study 2A, we tested whether manipulating descriptive social norms and
scrutiny affects decisions about whether to add a female candidate to a majority-male
group with a sample of participants with work experience. Specifically, we investigated
whether, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, individuals strive to meet descriptive social norms
for diversity when under threat of possible scrutiny but not in cases where scrutiny is
absent.
Method
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Participants. Five hundred and fifty-six Master of Business Administration
(MBA) students completed this study. This represented the entire incoming class at a
U.S. business school. 57% of the participants were male, 25% had previous managerial
experience before starting their MBA, and participants’ average age was 27.7 years.
Sample size was determined a priori, data analysis was conducted only once all data were
collected, we do not exclude any data, and we report all measures and manipulations.
Procedures. Participants were asked to imagine their company had given them the
task of assembling a seven-person panel for submission to an industry conference. They
were told six of the seven panelists had already been determined, and they were
responsible for selecting the final panelist. All participants saw an image of two women
and four men representing the six predetermined panelists. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four experimental conditions (surpassed social norm or unmet social
norm x unscrutinized or scrutinized) described below.
Participants saw images of five seven-person panels representing other panel
submissions to the conference. Participants randomly assigned to the surpassed social
norm condition saw that four of these other panel submissions had one woman each while
one panel submission had no women on it (i.e. the average number of women on other
panels was 0.8); participants randomly assigned to the unmet social norm condition saw
that four of these panel submissions had three women each while one panel submission
had two women on it (i.e. the average number of women on other panels was 2.8).
Therefore, in the surpassed social norm condition, the participant’s current panel (which
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included two women) already exceeded the descriptive social norm for gender diversity
(0.8 women); in the unmet social norm condition, the participant’s current panel (which
included two women) was below the descriptive social norm for gender diversity (2.8
women).
Participants were told panels were generally accepted based on speaker quality
and years of industry experience of the panelists. Participants randomly assigned to the
unscrutinized condition were told the review process was “blind”: the names and photos
of the panelists would not be submitted for evaluation (i.e. it would be impossible for the
panels to be scrutinized with regards to gender composition). Participants randomly
assigned to the scrutinized condition saw no such statement. Past research suggests that
impression management concerns often arise when people simply know they are being
evaluated (Leary & Kowalski, 1990), suggesting that when the evaluation process is not
blind, scrutiny can be expected to affect decisions.11
Participants were then shown two potential candidates–Candidate A and
Candidate B–for the final panelist. One image depicted a female candidate who had 10
years of industry experience and a speaker rating of 4.6; the other image depicted a male
candidate who had 12 years of industry experience and a speaker rating of 4.8. Which
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In a separate pilot study, we asked participants to rate how much they agreed or
disagreed on a 7-point scale with the statements, “My decision is under scrutiny with
regards to the gender diversity of the panel” and “The reviewer will pay attention to the
gender diversity of the panel when deciding which panels to accept”. Participants in the
scrutinized condition reported significantly higher scrutiny on gender diversity than
participants in the unscrutinized condition (Mscrutinized = 3.67, SDscrutinized = 1.84;
Munscrutinized = 2.66, SDunscrutinized = 1.92, t(150) = 3.34, p = 0.001).
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candidate was presented first as Candidate A (versus second as Candidate B) was
randomized. Participants then rated their preference for the two candidates on a scale
from 1 to 7 where 1 was labeled as “Strongly prefer Candidate A” and 7 was labeled as
“Strongly prefer Candidate B.” Study materials and a correlation matrix of all variables
collected in this study are available in the Online Supplement.
Results
Consistent with Hypothesis 1b and as illustrated in Figure 5A, participants in the
scrutinized condition had a significantly stronger preference for the female candidate in
the unmet social norm condition than in the surpassed social norm condition (t(277) =
2.24; p = 0.026). In other words, participants whose diversity decisions could be
scrutinized found it much more desirable to add a female candidate to a group when the
group had not yet met the social norm for gender diversity compared to when the group
had surpassed the social norm. However, consistent with Hypothesis 2, there were no
differences in the preferences expressed for the female candidate between the unmet
social norm and the surpassed social norm conditions when diversity decisions were not
under scrutiny (t(275) = 0.216; p = 0.829).
Next, we checked if there was a significant interaction between surpassed social
norms and the presence of scrutiny. We estimated a linear regression to predict the
preference for the female candidate with indicators for our scrutinized condition, our
unmet social norm condition, and the interaction between these two conditions (see Table
7, Model 1). The interaction term was positive but did not reach standard levels of
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statistical significance (p = 0.140).12 To strengthen our statistical power to detect an
interaction, we conducted a follow-up study with incentivized decisions (note that we
could not increase the sample size in this study because it already included every
incoming MBA student at our selected university, and we were not able to incentivize the
decisions of MBA students).
Study 2B: Replicating Study 2A With Incentives
In Study 2B, we sought to replicate our results from Study 2A but with real
monetary stakes that would increase our statistical power to detect an interaction between
the presence of scrutiny and a surpassed social norm for diversity. Again, we
experimentally manipulated scrutiny and descriptive social norms to test for a causal
relationship between these variables and the demographic characteristics of a newlyselected group member.
Method
Participants. Two hundred U.S. participants (51.5% male) were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid $0.15 to participate in a short online research study.
Sample size was determined a priori, data analysis was conducted only once all data were
collected, we do not exclude any data, and we report all measures and manipulations.
Procedures. As in Study 2A, participants were asked to imagine their company
had given them the task of assembling a seven-person panel for submission to an industry

12

We found a significant main effect of gender such that women had significantly higher
preferences for the female candidate compared to men (p = 0.022), but there was no
significant interaction.
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conference, that six of the seven panelists had already been determined (two women and
four men), and that they were responsible for selecting the final panelist. Again, they
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.
In this study, we simplified the way the descriptive social norm was manipulated.
Participants randomly assigned to the surpassed social norm condition were told
competitive intelligence suggested the other panel submissions would have 1.25 women
on average; participants randomly assigned to the unmet social norm condition were told
the other panel submissions would have 2.75 women on average.
Participants were then told a reviewer would evaluate all panel submissions and
choose to “accept” 75% of them. If their panel submission was accepted, participants
would receive a bonus payment. All participants were initially allocated a $0.25 bonus,
but participants had to “pay” to select the last panelist, and this cost was deducted from
their promised bonus. Participants randomly assigned to the unscrutinized condition were
told the review process was “blind”: the names and photos of the panelists would not be
submitted for evaluation (i.e. it would be impossible for the panels to be scrutinized with
regards to gender composition). Participants randomly assigned to the scrutinized
condition saw no such statement.
Participants were then offered the choice among three candidates for their final
panelist. One image depicted a female candidate who had 10 years of industry
experience, a speaker rating of 4.6, and cost $0.15 to select. The other images depicted
male candidates who had similar qualifications (11 or 12 years of industry experience;
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speaker ratings of 4.5 or 4.8) and cost $0.10 and $0.11 to select. Our outcome of interest
was what fraction of participants in each condition selected the female candidate. We
made the female candidate slightly more expensive to reflect research suggesting that
women are more expensive to recruit and/or hire in contexts where diversity is lacking
(e.g., on corporate boards and other contexts where less than 50% of the workforce is
female, see Leslie, Manchester, & Dahm, 2016). Finally, participants reported their
gender identity and whether they had ever attended or organized a conference in the past
10 years. Study materials and a correlation matrix of all variables collected in this study
are available in the Online Supplement.
Results
Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, participants in the scrutinized condition were
significantly more likely to select the female candidate in the unmet social norm
condition than in the surpassed social norm condition (z = 2.941; p = 0.0033; see Figure
5B). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there were no such differences in the likelihood of
selecting the female candidate in the unmet social norm and the surpassed social norm
conditions when there was no scrutiny (z = 0.242; p = 0.808).
To test for an interaction between the presence of scrutiny and unmet social
norms, we estimated an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to
predict the choice of a female candidate with indicators for our scrutinized condition, our
unmet social norm condition, and the interaction between these two conditions (see Table
7, Model 2). We found that the interaction term was positive and statistically significant
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(β = 0.270; p = 0.028). This further supports Hypothesis 2 that predicts when shaping the
composition of groups, decision makers will only conform to the social norm for
diversity when they are under scrutiny.
Discussion
Studies 2A and 2B directly manipulate scrutiny and descriptive social norms to
provide direct tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2 and show that decision makers responsible
for shaping group composition strive to increase group diversity when the group in
question has not yet met the social norm for diversity on a scrutinized dimension (gender
in the case of these studies). However, motivation to further increase diversity is reduced
once the social norm has been met, and social norms do not exert this influence when
scrutiny is not present.
STUDY 3: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF VISIBILITY
In Study 3, we manipulated descriptive social norms and a group’s visibility to
investigate whether the influence of descriptive social norms on decisions about group
diversity is moderated by a group’s visibility, and we also extend our study of group
diversity to explore a social category besides gender.
Method
Participants. Six hundred and three U.S. participants (52.9% male; 80.4%
Caucasian) were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in a short
online research study in exchange for $0.30. Sample size was determined a priori, data
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analysis was conducted only once all data were collected, we do not exclude any data,
and we report all measures and manipulations.
Procedures. Participants were told to imagine they were the manager of a team of
five people and were hiring a sixth team member. All participants saw an image of one
black man and four white men representing their current team. They were also told their
HR department cared about the racial diversity of teams and the HR department could
review team compositions and choose to punish teams deemed to have inadequate racial
diversity, creating scrutiny on the dimension of racial diversity in all conditions.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.
Participants randomly assigned to the surpassed social norm condition were told that
other teams of their size included an average of 0.25 black people. Participants randomly
assigned to the unmet social norm condition were told that other teams of their size
included an average of 1.75 black people.
To manipulate visibility, participants were either randomly assigned to learn
either: (1) their team was “not very important” in the company so there was a low
probability that the HR department would review the composition of their team (the low
visibility condition); or (2) their team was “very important” in the company so there was
a high probability that the HR department would review the composition of their team
(the high visibility condition).13

13

In a separate pilot study, we asked participants to rate how much they agreed or
disagreed on a 7-point scale with the statements, “My team is visible in the company”
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Participants were then offered the choice of two candidates for their new team
member. One image depicted a black male candidate who would come with a bonus of
$0.03 to participants if they chose him; the other image depicted a white male candidate
who would come with a bonus of $0.10 to participants if they chose him. We incentivized
participants to choose the white man in order to overcome social desirability concerns
and place some cost on increasing diversity. Participants were told they would keep the
bonus associated with the candidate they chose unless the HR department reviewed their
team and chose to penalize their team for a lack of racial diversity.
Finally, participants reported their racial and gender identities. Study materials
and a correlation matrix of all variables collected in this study are available in the Online
Supplement.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 1b and all previous studies, participants were
significantly more likely to select the black candidate in the unmet social norm condition
than in the surpassed social norm condition (z = 4.279; p < 0.0001; see Figure 6). In
other words, decision makers added the black candidate to their group at a lower rate
once their group had surpassed the descriptive social norm for racial diversity. In
addition, there was a significant main effect of visibility, such that participants were

and “My team receives a lot of attention in the company”. Participants in the high
visibility condition reported significantly higher scores on these items than participants in
the low visibility condition (Mhigh_visibility = 6.39, SDhigh_visibility = 0.97; Mlow_visibility = 2.25,
SDlow_visibility = 1.49; t(147) = 20.04; p < 0.0001).
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significantly more likely to select the black candidate when their team was highly visible
than when it was not (z = 9.247; p < 0.0001).
To test Hypothesis 3 that visibility moderates the effect of descriptive social
norms, we tested for an interaction between visibility and social norms. To do this, we
estimated an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to predict the
choice of the black candidate with indicators for our high visibility condition, our unmet
social norm condition, and the interaction between these two conditions (see Table 8).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we found the interaction term between visibility and norms
was positive and statistically significant (β = 0.151; p = 0.043).
Overall, Study 3 conceptually replicates our previous studies, extends our findings
to underrepresented groups besides women, and shows the moderating effect of visibility
on decisions about group diversity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across four experiments and one field study, we offer convergent evidence that
those who shape the diversity of groups attend to and seek to conform to the descriptive
social norms for diversity set by peer groups when under scrutiny. In Study 1, we showed
that U.S. corporate boards are disproportionately likely to include exactly two women
(the descriptive social norm), and they appear to lose motivation to add additional women
once they have matched the descriptive social norm by including two female directors.
We also found that these effects are more pronounced among more visible companies,
consistent with our theory that these effects are driven in part by scrutiny and impression
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management motives. In addition, we did not find any clustering when we analyzed data
on the race/ethnicity of board members in our field data, consistent with our theory that
scrutiny is required to produce clustering at the descriptive social norm.14 In Studies 2
and 3, we directly manipulated descriptive social norms, scrutiny, and visibility to show
that each of these influences group diversity decisions as our theory predicts in groups
besides corporate boards and when we examine social categories besides gender.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Our theory and findings help us understand how decision makers with the power
to shape group composition respond to the threat of negative scrutiny surrounding
diversity. Individuals responsible for group compositions look to descriptive social
norms, matching the levels of diversity found in peer groups at an unusually high rate.
This behavior leads to homogeneous levels of diversity across groups, providing another
contributing explanation for the persistent underrepresentation of women and racial
minorities in many organizational contexts. Our work also helps provide a fuller
understanding of diversity-related hiring decisions, suggesting when women and racial
minorities will be particularly attractive candidates for inclusion in groups and when
groups can be expected to lessen their efforts to increase diversity.
Our findings suggest new avenues for policy makers seeking to increase diversity.
Rather than simply targeting bias and stereotyping among those making hiring decisions

14

As discussed in Study 1A, an analysis of media attention to board diversity showed that
97% of such articles discuss gender diversity, while just 18% even mention racial or
ethnic diversity.
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(e.g., through diversity training) or seeking to shape underrepresented candidates’
preferences and skill sets (e.g., by training women to negotiate), more interventions may
be needed to change the perceived norms around diversity. Groups appear to cluster at
the descriptive social norm for diversity because it is an adaptive impression management
strategy: by clustering at the social norm, they can escape negative scrutiny regarding
their diversity levels. But the fact that groups can escape negative scrutiny once they
reach the descriptive social norm for diversity implies that those scrutinizing these groups
(e.g., shareholders, the media, etc.) may be too easily satisfied. Shifting the standards of
those who scrutinize diversity as well as those of the decision makers capable of shaping
group diversity from focusing on descriptive social norms in peer groups to instead
achieving more ambitious norms (e.g., matching the levels of diversity in the general
population) may be a promising new avenue for increasing the diversity of highly visible,
scrutinized groups. If powerful institutions or individuals endorse new norms regarding
gender and racial representation, perhaps this could lead to changes in the norms that
influence group composition decisions (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012). For instance,
decisions by the Supreme Court have been shown to change attitudes and perceptions of
norms in the realm of gay rights (Tankard & Paluck, 2017).
Our work also points to scrutiny as a lever for change. Scrutiny can come from a
variety of sources, but some sources may be more influential than others (Oliver, 1991).
Applying greater scrutiny to group diversity should lead groups to increase their
diversity. One extreme form of scrutiny when it comes to diversity is to enforce legal
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penalties on public companies for a failure to diversify. However, even when policy
makers have established laws mandating minimum levels of gender diversity on the
corporate boards of public companies, some companies have elected to become private
rather than comply with the laws (Miller, 2014). Forced compliance therefore comes with
the risk of creating at least some reactance (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015). An
alternative to mandated diversity may be to shower positive attention on groups that
reach high levels of diversity. Treating diversity as an ideal may help reshape perceptions
of the relevant norm, leading injunctive norms (or norms about ideals) to overshadow
descriptive social norms.
Limitations and Future Research
One paradox suggested by our theorizing and empirics surrounds changing
descriptive norms: U.S. corporate boards shifted from clustering at one woman to
clustering at two women (albeit slowly) over the last twenty years in spite of the fact that
our theorizing about diversity thresholds would predict a stagnation of board diversity at
the one-woman threshold. A noteworthy fact, however, is that this shift in clustering
followed the passage of Norway’s “Women on Boards” act in 2003. This legislation
required public and state-owned companies in Norway to include at least 40% women
and may have made the topic of gender diversity on corporate boards in the U.S. more
salient at that time, providing increased scrutiny of boards with few women and making
the need for gender diversity more salient, driving the shift to twokenism from tokenism.
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Future research exploring how descriptive social norms can be shifted in the context of
diversity would be extremely valuable.
Another puzzling question raised by our findings is whether more diverse groups
may actually discriminate more than less diverse groups. We cannot evaluate whether
any specific group or organization is actively “managing” diversity for impression
management reasons. However, overall, we do see a pattern suggesting this is the case
and suggesting that–contrary to the expectation that more diverse groups will attract more
women and racial minority candidates (Avery, 2003; Avery & McKay, 2006)–such
groups are less likely to select women and racial minorities than others after reaching the
descriptive social norm for diversity. It would be valuable for future research to examine
when and how social norms around diversity can hurt rather than help women and
minorities.
Although our field and experimental studies provide convergent evidence in
support of our theory and hypotheses, in our experiments, we only examine the
judgments and decisions of individuals, while group member selection processes are
varied and complex and often involve many decision makers. Extensive past research has
shown that studies of individual decisions and insights about individual psychology can
further our understanding of group and organizational outcomes (Greve, 2008;
Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Staw, 1991).
However, there are unquestionably limitations in our approach.
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We only test our theorizing in a single field setting (albeit in an economically and
organizationally important one). Future research examining how these phenomena play
out in other important organizational contexts would undoubtedly be useful. Our
experiments may also be susceptible to demand effects, which could limit their external
validity. In addition, in our field setting and in our experiments, the groups we examine
are relatively small in size (i.e. less than 20 members). Additional research in exploring
how group size moderates the effects of descriptive social norms and scrutiny could be
informative. For example, in larger groups, the behavior of peer groups could feel less
relevant as the size of the group might create a greater sense of its uniqueness, reducing
pressure to conform to descriptive social norms. Alternatively, larger groups may feel
more scrutinized because of their size, leading them to react more dramatically to
descriptive social norms.
Finally, more research into the psychological mechanisms that lead descriptive
social norms and scrutiny to produce the group diversity threshold effects we document
could be illuminating. Past research suggests that norms may be particularly relevant in
the context of group diversity decisions because of ambiguity about how much diversity
is enough and the fear of being singled out from peers (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001;
Festinger, 1954; Sherif, 1936; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Future research isolating the
specific mechanisms through which descriptive social norms exert their influence would
be valuable and could help identify potent interventions for changing salient norms.
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Future research testing new interventions to reduce the reliance on descriptive social
norms and make other norms more salient would also be extremely valuable.
Conclusion
Our work highlights the important roles that descriptive social norms, goal
setting, scrutiny, and visibility play in shaping decisions about group diversity while
answering questions about how individuals assess whether a group is diverse and how
groups respond to scrutiny around their diversity levels. We find empirical evidence that
descriptive social norms and threshold effects lead to an overabundance of groups with
exactly the same level of diversity in an important organizational context, providing
evidence of a previously unexplored phenomenon that may contribute to the
underrepresentation of women and minorities in many organizational groups. By
shedding light on novel factors that influence group diversity decisions, we illuminate
potential new avenues for increasing the diversity of groups.
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FIGURES
Figure 1
Comparison of Actual Distribution of Women on (A) S&P 1500 Boards and (B) S&P 500
Boards with Simulated Expected Distribution of Women
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Figure 2
How Tokenism and Twokenism Shifted as Social Norms Changed from 2002 to 2013
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Figure 3
Firm Visibility Moderates the Extent of Twokenism
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Figure 4
Participants in Study 1C Less Likely to Increase Gender Diversity of Boards Once
Boards Include Two Women (and Thus Exceed the Social Norm)
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Figure 5A
Participants’ Preferences for Women Are Influenced by Social Norms and Scrutiny
in Study 2A

Figure 5B
Interaction Between Social Norms and Scrutiny in Study 2B
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Figure 6
Interaction Between Social Norms and Visibility in Study 3
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TABLES
Table 1
Summary Statistics Describing S&P 1500 Dataset
Proportion of all
Directors
86%
14%
91%
3.0%
3.7%
1.7%
0.81%
84%
13%
2.8%
0.37%
0.07%

Male
Female
Caucasian
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity
1 Board Seat
2 Board Seats
3 Board Seats
4 Board Seats
5 Board Seats
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix for S&P 1500 Board Data in 2013 (N = 1,441)
1
1.00

2

3

4

5

6

1. Size of Board
2. Number of
0.51*** 1.00
Female Directors
3. Number of
Racial Minority
0.36*** 0.30*** 1.00
Directors
4. Logarithm of
Market
0.44*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 1.00
Capitalization
5. Logarithm of
0.43*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.59*** 1.00
Media Mentions
6. Member of S&P
0.43*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.71*** 0.59*** 1.00
500
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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Table 3
Comparison of Actual and Expected Number of Female Directors Across S&P 1500
Boards of Different Sizes
Excess
Excess
Excess
Excess
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
of Boards
of Boards
of Boards
of Boards
Observed
Observed
Observed
Observed
with 0
with 1
with 2
with 3
Size of
Female
Female
Female
Female
Board
n
Directors
Director
Directors
Directors
6 or
2.74%
-5.79%
-16.96%
37.36%
124
fewer
(2.89%)
(11.23%)
(28.15%)
(109.43%)
-2.60%
4.38%
10.06%
-66.06%
7
199
(3.34%)
(8.98%)
(16.79%)
(54.18%)
-15.98%**
23.15%**
-8.42%
-24.81%
8
241
(5.57%)
(8.04%)
(11.18%)
(24.50%)
-26.32%**
14.16%*
20.60%*
-34.31%*
9
283
(8.05%)
(7.22%)
(9.09%)
(14.04%)
-38.00%***
18.88%*
16.51%
-16.12%
10
235
(10.85%)
(8.58%)
(10.14%)
(13.57%)
-50.56%***
6.67%
28.69%**
7.47%
11
198
(14.71%)
(9.95%)
(10.95%)
(13.42%)
-76.36%**
-22.97%
64.40%***
-6.40%
12
100
(28.08%)
(15.09%)
(15.38%)
(17.34%)
13 or
-58.37%*
-20.70%
49.34%***
22.85%
134
more
(24.01%)
(13.63%)
(13.10%)
(15.55%)
Note: This table reports the difference between the actual percent of boards with a
given number of female directors and the simulated expected percent of boards
with that number of female directors conditional on the size of the board. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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Table 4
Boards Less Likely to Add Additional Women Once They Include at Least Two
Women
Board Added Woman = 1 (ordinary least squares
regression)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Sample:
S&P 1500
S&P 1500
S&P 500
S&P 500
Number of Women on
-0.0033
-0.039***
-0.0056
-0.035*
Board
(0.0079)
(0.0090)
(0.012)
(0.015)
Indicator for Two or
-0.039*
-0.034*
-0.092***
-0.090***
More Women on Board (0.016)
(0.016)
(0.023)
(0.024)
Controls Present
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
9,989
9,936
4,131
4,117
2
R
0.0032
0.030
0.017
0.045
Note. This table shows a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions predicting
whether boards add women conditional on the number of women already on the
board and whether the board had met the descriptive social norm for gender diversity
(i.e. already had at least two women) in the S&P 1500 (Models 1 and 2) and the S&P
500 (a subset of the S&P 1500; Models 3 and 4). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. When controls are present, regressions include fixed effects for board
size, fixed effects for industry, fixed effects for stock market index, and a continuous
control for market capitalization.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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Table 5
More Visible Companies Show Larger Discontinuities at the Descriptive Social
Norm

Number of Women on Board

Board Added Woman = 1 (ordinary least
squares regression)
Model 1
Model 2
-0.017*
-0.043***
(0.0083)
(0.0090)
-0.27
-0.023
(0.017)
(0.017)
0.026***
0.017**
(0.0042)
(0.0049)
-0.0018
-0.00018

Indicator for Two or More Women on
Board
Centered Logarithm of Media
Mentions
Number of Women on Board x
Centered Logarithm of Media
(0.0049)
(0.0053)
Mentions
Indicator for Two or More Women on -0.021*
-0.021*
Board x Centered Logarithm of Media
(0.010)
(0.010)
Mentions
No
Yes
Controls Present
Observations
9,781
9,743
2
R
0.012
0.033
Note. This table shows two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions predicting
whether boards add women conditional on the number of women already on the
board and whether the board had met the descriptive social norm for gender
diversity (i.e. already had at least two women), interacted with the centered
logarithm of the number of media mentions a company receives. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. When controls are present, regressions include fixed
effects for board size, fixed effects for industry, fixed effects for stock market
index, and a continuous control for market capitalization.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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Table 6
Regression Predicting the Selection of the Female Candidate to Serve on a
Corporate Board in Study 1C
B
0.0401
Number of Women on Original Board
(0.0448)
-0.187†
Original Board Has Two or More Women
(0.100)
Observations
479
2
R
0.0134
Note. This table shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
predicting whether participants added a woman to a board conditional on the
number of women already on the board and whether the board had met the
descriptive social norm for gender diversity (i.e. already included at least two
women). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels,
respectively
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Table 7
Regression Predicting Preference for Female Candidates to Serve on Panels in
Studies 2A and 2B
Model 1,
Model 2,
Study 2A
Study 2B
Rating of Female
Chose Female
DV:
Candidate
Candidate
0.647**
0.031
Scrutinized
(0.243)
(0.075)
0.0511
0.018
Unmet Social Norm
(0.244)
(0.075)
Scrutinized x Unmet Social
0.508
0.270*
Norm
(0.344)
(0.122)
Observations
556
200
R2
0.0563
0.0837
Note. These ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions present the preference for the
female candidate to serve on a panel in Studies 2A and 2B. Scrutinized is an
indicator for the Scrutinized condition. Unmet Social Norm is an indicator for the
unmet social norm condition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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Table 8
Regression Predicting the Selection of a Black Candidate for a Team in Study 3
B
0.296***
High Visibility
(0.055)
0.089
Unmet Social Norm
(0.053)
0.151*
High Visibility x Unmet Social Norm
(0.043)
Observations
603
2
R
0.175
Note. This ordinary least squares (OLS) regression predicts whether participants
chose the black candidate to serve on a team in Study 3. High Visibility is an
indicator for the High Visibility condition. Unmet Social Norm is an indicator for
the unmet social norm condition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively
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CHAPTER 2. THE ISOLATED CHOICE EFFECT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR GENDER DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS
Edward H. Chang, Erika L. Kirgios, Aneesh Rai, and Katherine L. Milkman
Forthcoming in Management Science
ABSTRACT
We highlight a feature of personnel selection decisions that can influence the gender
diversity of groups and teams. Specifically, we show that people are less likely to choose
candidates whose gender would increase group diversity when making personnel
selections in isolation (i.e., when they are responsible for selecting a single group
member) than when making collections of choices (i.e., when they are responsible for
selecting multiple group members). We call this the isolated choice effect. Across 6
preregistered experiments (n=3,509), we demonstrate that the isolated choice effect has
important consequences for group diversity. When making sets of hiring and selection
decisions (as opposed to making a single hire), people construct more gender-diverse
groups. Mediation and moderation studies suggest that people do not attend as much to
diversity when making isolated selection choices, which drives this effect.
Link to OSF with Online Supplement and open data:
https://osf.io/p2c8h/?view_only=96cb464b1b674750a3579a6228a89bdd
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INTRODUCTION
Many organizations publicly espouse commitments to increase their diversity and
inclusiveness. For example, the majority of Fortune 500 companies boast executives
responsible for workplace diversity initiatives (Kwoh, 2012) and include diversity
statements on their websites (Jones & Donnelly, 2017). In spite of this, many wellintentioned organizations remain remarkably homogeneous, which has prompted a large
body of research exploring why homogeneity persists and tactics for increasing
workplace diversity (Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart, 2017; Bohnet, Van
Geen, & Bazerman, 2015; Schroeder & Risen, 2016).
Notably, diversity objectives are typically set by organizational leaders who have
a bird’s-eye view of how hiring decisions shape the overall diversity of their
organizations. However, the implementation of these objectives is often left to individual
managers and teams who frequently make hiring decisions one at a time, making it
challenging to take a global perspective on the impact each hire will have on
organizational diversity. We propose that this common feature of hiring decisions–that
they are often made in isolation–may have important and previously unappreciated
implications.
In this paper, we show that people are less likely to choose candidates whose
gender would increase group diversity when making personnel selections in isolation
(i.e., when they are responsible for selecting only a single group member) than when
making collections of choices (i.e., when they are responsible for selecting multiple
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group members). We call this phenomenon the isolated choice effect, and it means groups
constructed through an aggregation of isolated selection decisions are less diverse than
groups whose members are selected in collections.
When people make hiring or selection decisions in isolation, we theorize that they
attend less to how their selected candidate will affect the diversity of the group than when
making collections of such decisions. Past research has shown that people are able to
rapidly and accurately form impressions of the diversity of a group of people (Phillips,
Slepian, & Hughes, 2018). The diversity of a collection of people selected together is
therefore likely to be easy to assess and salient. However, because diversity is inherently
a group-level property (Harrison & Klein, 2007) and any one individual cannot be
“diverse,” diversity is less tangible and therefore likely to be less salient when making
selection decisions in isolation. Past research has shown that salient attributes are overweighted when we make choices (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012, 2013). We
therefore hypothesize that the decreased salience of diversity when selection decisions
are made in isolation (instead of in collections) will produce the isolated choice effect.
Past research on choice bracketing in consumer settings provides suggestive
evidence that making isolated selection decisions may lessen the gender diversity of
constructed groups (Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999). Specifically, people have been
shown to select less variety in products when making consumption decisions one at a
time (e.g., on a series of separate occasions) rather than simultaneously (Read, Antonides,
Van den Ouden, & Trienekens, 2001; Read & Loewenstein, 1995; Simonson, 1990;
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Simonson & Winer, 1992). In one canonical study, Simonson (1990) offered students
snack choices at three meetings spread across three weeks. Students who were
randomized to choose one snack each week were significantly more likely to choose the
same snack each time (and thus a less diverse set of snacks) than students randomized to
simultaneously choose snacks for all three meetings at the first weekly gathering.15
Notably, there are important differences between consumer choice and hiring
decisions that make it unclear whether we should observe the same patterns in both
settings. First, past research on choice bracketing in the consumer space typically focuses
on consumers’ preferences for “variety,” wherein consumers choose different items
(rather than the exact same item) in consumption bundles. For example, choosing a
Snickers and a Twix would be considered variety-seeking, even though both are
chocolate candy bars, as this represents more variety than choosing two Snickers bars (or
two Twix bars). Here, the exact same consumer product can be consumed more than
once. For hiring or selection decisions, because the same person cannot be hired
repeatedly, all sets of decisions tautologically have identical variety since each hiring
decision requires selecting a different person. However, some sets of decisions differ in
their demographic “diversity,” which is the focus of this paper.

More broadly, the isolated choice effect is related to extensive prior work on the
behavioral consequences of narrow versus broad decision frames in a wide range of
settings ranging from labor supply decisions to budgeting (Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997; Thaler, 1999).
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A second key distinction between past research on choice bracketing in consumer
contexts and our work on personnel selection pertains to what drives the underlying
decisions. Many of the mechanisms shown to operate in the realm of consumer choice
cannot apply in the realm of personnel selection. For instance, past research has posited
that one reason choosing products all at once rather than over time leads to product
diversification is because people have uncertain forecasts of their future preferences
(Read & Loewenstein, 1995; Simonson, 1990). Further, because some choices made in
sets are made for future consumption periods (while isolated choices are made at the
moment of consumption), people may overestimate how much their tastes will change or
how satiated they will be by repeatedly consuming the same product, or they may choose
variety to reduce the risk of consuming something undesirable repeatedly. In personnel
selection decisions, however, these factors are unlikely to play a role because the same
person cannot be hired for multiple positions, and people are not “consumed” like
products. While expecting to get bored with Twix bars quickly or worrying that you
won’t like Twix bars as much as anticipated may prompt the inclusion of a Snickers bars
in your consumption bundle, a hiring manager is unlikely to think about choosing male
and female job candidates in this way. Every job candidate is unique (i.e., not all men
will act alike, nor will all women), but all Twix bars taste the same. Thus, leading
explanations for these past findings about consumer choice cannot easily explain our
findings in the realm of hiring decisions.
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In this paper, we propose and explore another mechanism to account for our
findings, which may also influence consumer choices. Specifically, we examine the
salience of group-level diversity. Because groups can have emergent properties (e.g.,
diversity) that are not apparent when considering individuals, people choosing groups
may weight these emergent group properties in their decisions. Past research has
proposed this mechanism as a contributor to variety-seeking in consumer choice domains
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Read et al., 2001), but it has received scant empirical
attention.
Across 6 preregistered experiments (n = 3,509), we provide evidence for the
isolated choice effect. Consistent with our theorizing, we find the salience of group
diversity mediates the effect and drawing attention to diversity attenuates the effect.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we examined how the isolated choice effect influences the gender
diversity of job candidates chosen in a hypothetical hiring scenario. We predicted that
participants tasked with hiring for a single position (i.e., those randomized to an isolated
choice condition) would choose a lower proportion of women than participants tasked
with hiring for multiple positions (i.e., those randomized to a collective choice condition).
Methods
Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 525 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After excluding participants who did not follow directions
(following our preregistration plan), we were left with 500 participants (48.8% of whom
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identified as men). Participants were paid $0.70 to fill out a survey that took about five
minutes to complete. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=4kg79v).
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine they were hiring for a technology
company that was looking to fill five different roles: software engineer, product manager,
user experience designer, marketing analyst, and sales representative.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the isolated choice condition or the
collective choice condition. In the isolated choice condition, participants were told they
would be hiring one person to fill one of these five roles. In the collective choice
condition, participants were told they would be hiring five people – one person to fill
each role. As a result, participants in the isolated choice condition made one hiring
decision, while participants in the collective choice condition made five hiring decisions
simultaneously (i.e., all five decisions were shown on the same screen). To balance the
number of hiring decisions made across conditions, we assigned five times as many
participants to the isolated choice condition as the collective choice condition.
Before making hiring decisions, participants were shown descriptions of each of the five
roles the organization was seeking to fill (e.g., “A software engineer writes computer
code to design, develop, maintain, test, and evaluate computer software.”). In the isolated
choice condition, participants were shown the same five job descriptions but were
randomly assigned to fill just one of the five roles. After reading these job descriptions,
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participants were asked to make hiring decisions for the role(s) they were responsible for
filling.
For each role, participants were asked to choose among three candidates who had
prior work experience in a relevant job. The candidates were held constant across
conditions, so the decisions participants had to make were identical across conditions; all
that differed was the number of decisions participants were responsible for making.
Because participants in both conditions always chose among three candidates for each
position, participants in both conditions were engaging in joint evaluation (as opposed to
separate evaluation) for each decision (Bohnet et al., 2015), as will be the case across all
studies in this paper. The three candidates for each role always included at least two men,
and we varied candidate quality such that the woman always had a moderate amount of
experience.16 In addition, for one role, we included three men to obscure our study’s
focus on gender diversity. Participants were provided with each candidate’s picture
(taken from the Chicago Face Database; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), most recent
job, and number of years of experience. All study materials are available in our Online
Supplement.
Results

16

The woman always had fewer years of experience than one of the men and more years
of experience than the other (e.g., 4 years versus 5 years or 2 years). We made the woman
marginally less qualified than one of the men in order to avoid ceiling effects that might
arise from social desirability concerns in experiments. In Studies 2 and 4A, we replicate
our effects when there are no differences in quality across candidates by gender.
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Our dependent variable of interest was whether a woman was selected in each
hiring decision.17 In the isolated choice condition, women were chosen in 7.4% of all
hiring decisions; in the collective choice condition, women were chosen in 18.0% of all
hiring decisions. Following our preregistered analysis plan, we ran an ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors clustered by participant to predict whether
a female candidate was chosen in each hiring decision. Because the unit of analysis was a
single hiring decision, each participant in the isolated choice condition was included
once, while each participant in the collective choice condition was included in the
regression five times. Our only predictor variable was an indicator variable for being in
the isolated choice condition. We found that the effect of being in the isolated choice
condition on the likelihood of selecting a female candidate was significant (bisolated_choice =
-0.105, SE = 0.026, p < 0.001; 95% CI: [-0.157, -0.054]).1819 In other words, making
isolated choices produced less gender-diverse groups of hires than making sets of
choices.20

17

For decisions where all three candidates were men, the dependent variable was coded
as zero in both conditions. Our results are identical regardless of whether we include
these decisions in our analyses.
18
As a robustness check, we reran all analyses in all studies using logistic regressions
rather than OLS regressions. None of the results change in significance based on the
model used (see the Online Supplement, page 4).
19
Complete regression tables are presented in our Online Supplement for all regressions
in this manuscript.
20
In this study, the decision in which all three candidates were men included one black
man. As an exploratory analysis, we tested whether the rate of choosing the black man
varied across conditions. Consistent with the isolated choice effect, we found that the
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Discussion
In this study, we found that people hired a lower proportion of women when
making personnel decisions in isolation rather than in collections. In a supplemental
study, we replicated this effect using a different organizational context and different
stimuli (see Online Supplement Study S1).
One potential concern about the design of this study, however, is that participants
in the collective choice condition had to make five times as many decisions as those in
the isolated choice condition, so fatigue or depletion could be responsible for our
findings. To address this concern, we also ran a preregistered replication of this study
where participants in the isolated choice condition made four additional, unrelated
decisions (e.g., choosing between couches) in order to hold the number of decisions
constant between conditions. Participants were assigned to one of the five hiring
decisions at random, and the hiring decision was presented in the same order across
conditions (first, second, third, fourth, or fifth) to balance the timing of decisions across
conditions. We again replicated our results (see Online Supplement Study S2), suggesting
that our findings cannot be explained by fatigue.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we ran a conceptual replication of Study 1 using a different study
paradigm. Our new paradigm involved a more natural and familiar task with authentic

black man was chosen marginally more often in the collective choice condition (39.1%)
than in the isolated choice condition (24.7%), z = 1.75, p = 0.08.
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stimuli: participants were asked to select famous authors for inclusion in a high school
English class.
Methods
Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 600 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After excluding participants who did not follow directions
(following our preregistration plan), we were left with 598 participants (53.0% of whom
identified as men). This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=6sw3eg).
Procedure. Participants were truthfully told we were interested in understanding
which authors Americans think students should be exposed to in high school. They were
told they would see a list of 25 authors whose books are commonly read in American
high schools and that they would be asked to recommend some number of those authors
for inclusion in a high school English course (and we did, in fact, share their
recommendations with a high school English teacher who had influence in determining
curriculum at their school). Eight of the 25 authors were women. The authors were
chosen by combining recommendations from GoodReads and Buzzfeed (Althouse,
2013).
Participants were randomly assigned to either an isolated choice condition or a
collective choice condition and saw a list of the names and photos of the same 25 authors
in each condition. In the isolated choice condition, participants were asked to recommend
one author. They were asked to select this sole author by ranking all of the authors in
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their mind and selecting their #1, #2, #3, #4, or #5 ranked author for inclusion in a high
school English course. We randomly assigned participants in the isolated choice
condition to tell us either their #1, #2, #3, #4, or #5 ranked author. In the collective choice
condition, participants were asked to recommend five authors. They were asked to select
this set of authors by ranking all of the authors in their mind and selecting their top five
authors for inclusion in a high school English course. Thus, in both conditions,
participants were asked to rank all 25 of the authors, but they reported either their top five
or one member of their top five at random. Since participants saw all 25 authors in both
conditions, all decisions were made under joint evaluation.
This procedure ensured that the aggregation of isolated decisions across
participants was equivalent in overall quality to the aggregation of collective decisions
across participants, as both sets of decisions should contain equal numbers of #1, #2, #3,
#4, and #5 ranked authors. However, in the collective choice condition, diversity should
be more salient because participants are asked to report a group of five authors as
opposed to only one individual author. All study materials are available in our Online
Supplement.
Results
Our outcome of interest was whether participants recommended female authors
for inclusion in an American high school English course. In the isolated choice condition,
24.0% of the recommended authors were women; in the collective choice condition,
29.5% of the recommended authors were women. Following our preregistered analysis
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plan, we ran an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered by
participant to predict the selection of a female author. As in past studies, the unit of
analysis was a single author recommendation, so participants in the collective choice
condition contributed five times as many observations to our regression as participants in
the isolated choice condition. Our only predictor variable was an indicator variable for
being in the isolated choice condition. We found that being in the isolated choice
condition significantly decreased participants’ likelihood of selecting a female author
(bisolated_choice = -0.0545, p = 0.047, 95% CI: [-0.108, -0.0008]). This study offers further
evidence that isolated choices lead to the selection of less gender-diverse groups than
collective choices.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we tested our proposed mechanism. We explored whether the isolated
choice effect arises because diversity is less salient when choices are made in isolation
than collectively. Study 3A is a mediation study, while Study 3B is a moderation study.
Study 3A
In Study 3A, we tested whether diversity (a property of groups but not
individuals) is more salient when making collective choices than when making isolated
choices and whether the salience of diversity mediates people’s personnel selection
decisions.
Methods
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Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 520 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After excluding participants who did not follow directions
(following our preregistration plan), we were left with 502 participants (43.8% of whom
identified as men). Participants were paid $0.60 to take a survey that could be completed
in about five minutes. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=q76fa4).
Procedures. We used the same stimuli and a similar study design to Study 1. As
in Study 1, participants were asked to imagine they were hiring for a technology
company that was looking to fill five different roles. Participants were randomly assigned
to either the isolated choice condition or the collective choice condition. Those in the
isolated choice condition were told they would be tasked with hiring one person to fill
one of these five roles. Those in the collective choice condition were told they would be
tasked with hiring five people, one for each role.
For each role, participants were asked to choose among three candidates who had
prior work experience in a relevant job. The candidates were held constant across
conditions. The three candidates for each job always included at least two men (and we
included three men as candidates for one job to obscure the fact that our study was
focused on gender diversity). Given our focus on gender diversity, in order to avoid
wasting participants in this study, we did not assign any participants in the isolated
choice condition to hire for the role where it was impossible to select a woman, and to
maintain parallelism in our design, we discarded hiring decisions made by participants in
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the collective choice condition for this role in our analyses (as per our preregistration).
Participants were provided with each candidate’s picture (taken from the Chicago Face
Database; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), most recent job, and number of years of
experience.
After participants had made their hiring selection(s), to test for our mechanism,
we asked participants to what extent they agreed with the following statement: “I
considered how my choice(s) would influence the diversity of the tech team hired when
making my decision(s)” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). All study
materials are available in our Online Supplement.
Results
Our dependent variable of interest was whether a woman was selected in each
hiring decision. Consistent with our previous results, in the isolated choice condition,
women were chosen in 15.3% of the hiring decisions; in the collective choice condition,
women were chosen in 21.1% of the hiring decisions (bisolated_choice = -0.058, SE = .030, p
= 0.054; 95% CI: [-0.117, 0]). Participants also reported that diversity was considered
less in their decision-making process in the isolated choice condition (Misolated_choice =
3.32, SD = 2.09) than in the collective choice condition (Mcollective_choice = 4.03, SD = 2.02;
t(500) = 3.02, p = 0.0027).
We next tested whether considering diversity mediated the relationship between
making isolated choices and selecting female candidates. First, there was a significant
main effect of assignment to the isolated choice condition on how much participants
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considered diversity (bisolated_choice = -0.704, SE = 0.232, p = 0.0023). Second, the
relationship between considering diversity and selecting a female candidate was also
significant (bconsidering_diversity = 0.059, SE = 0.0070, p < 0.001). Consistent with mediation,
the effect of assignment to the isolated choice condition on selecting a female candidate
(bisolated_choice = -0.061, SE = 0.030, p = 0.040)21 was eliminated when controlling for
diversity considerations (bisolated_choice = -0.020, SE = 0.028, p = 0.49). A Sobel test
confirmed that this reduction in effect size was significant (breduction= -0.042, SE = 0.015,
p = 0.0046), and a 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz,
2007; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) also produced a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for
the size of the indirect effect that excluded zero (95% CI: [-0.073, -0.015]).
Study 3B
Given the inherent limitations of mediation analyses, we also tested our
mechanism through a moderation study in which we manipulated rather than measured
whether diversity was salient. Specifically, in Study 3B, we tested whether the isolated
choice effect is eliminated when attention is drawn to diversity in both the isolated and
collective choice conditions.
Methods
Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 1,050 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After excluding participants who did not follow directions

21

Due to bootstrapping standard errors in the mediation analysis, estimates from the
mediation analysis vary slightly from estimates from the main regression.
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(following our preregistration plan), we were left with 1,038 participants (44.1% of
whom identified as men). Participants were paid $0.45 to take a survey that could be
completed in about four minutes. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=5sx59i).
Procedures. Similar to Studies 1 and 3A, participants in this study were asked to
imagine they were hiring for a technology company that was looking to fill five different
roles. This study used a 2x2 (isolated choice vs. collective choice x diversity valued vs.
control) factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to either the isolated
choice condition or the collective choice condition. To balance the number of hiring
decisions made across conditions, we assigned four times as many participants to the
isolated choice condition as the collective choice condition. Those in the isolated choice
condition were told they would be tasked with hiring one person to fill one of these five
roles. Those in the collective choice condition were told they would be tasked with hiring
five people, one for each role.
Participants were also randomly assigned to either a condition where attention
was drawn to diversity by stating that it was valued or a control condition where no such
statement was made. In the diversity valued condition, participants were told “The
company strongly values diversity” immediately prior to making their hiring selection(s);
in the control condition, we omitted this statement, so diversity was not made explicitly
salient.
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Participants had to choose among three candidates for each role they were asked
to fill. These candidates were held constant across conditions and always included at least
two men (one of the decisions included three men as candidates to conceal that our study
focused on gender diversity). Participants were provided with each candidate’s picture
(taken from the Chicago Face Database; Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), most recent
job, and number of years of experience. Finally, as a manipulation check, we asked
participants to rate their agreement with the statement “The company strongly values
diversity” on a scale from “1: Strongly disagree” to “5: Strongly agree.”
All study materials are available in our Online Supplement.
Results
Our manipulation check confirmed that participants in the diversity valued
condition believed that the organization valued diversity more than those in the control
condition (Mdiversity_valued = 4.42, SDdiversity_valued = 0.90; Mcontrol = 3.24, SDcontrol = 0.67;
t(1,036) = 23.85, p < 0.001), suggesting that our manipulation was successful.
Our dependent variable of interest was whether a woman was selected in each hiring
decision. When attention was not drawn explicitly to diversity, we found evidence of the
isolated choice effect: participants in the isolated choice condition hired women 15.0% of
the time, and participants in the collective choice condition hired women 25.3% of the
time (bisolated_choice = -0.103, SE = .030, p < 0.001; 95% CI: [-0.163, -0.044]; see Figure 1).
However, when attention was drawn to diversity by telling participants the organization
valued diversity, the isolated choice effect disappeared: participants in the isolated choice
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condition hired women 36.5% of the time, and participants in the collective choice
condition hired women 37.1% of the time (bisolated_choice = -0.006, SE = .034, p = 0.867;
95% CI: [-0.072, 0.060]; see Figure 1). There was also a significant interaction between
the diversity valued and isolated choice conditions (bisolated_choice*diversity_valued = 0.10, SE =
.045, p = 0.03; 95% CI: [0.009, 0.187]), suggesting drawing attention to diversity
moderated the effect of being in the isolated choice condition on the likelihood of
selecting a female candidate.
Discussion
Taken together, Studies 3A and 3B provide evidence that isolated choices lead to
less diverse hires because diversity is less salient when choices are made in isolation than
when they are made in collections. Study 3A shows that participants attend less to
diversity when making isolated choices than collective choices, and this mediates the
effect of isolated choices on the gender diversity of hired candidates. Study 3B shows
that the isolated choice effect is eliminated when attention is drawn to diversity
considerations by explicitly noting that a company values diversity.
In a supplemental study, we ran a 2x2 experiment where we varied whether choices were
made in isolation or collectively as well as whether we told participants the organization
they were helping had low levels of gender diversity (19% of its employees were women)
or high levels of gender diversity (48% of its employees were women). When gender
diversity was high (and therefore there would be no specific reason to attend to diversity),
we replicated the isolated choice effect, but when gender diversity was low (and diversity
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was thus a salient problem), we no longer observed a significant isolated choice effect
(see Online Supplement Study S3). This supplementary study provides further evidence
consistent with our proposed mechanism: diversity is more salient in collective choices
than isolated choices, which leads to more diverse hires when choices are made
collectively.
STUDY 4
In Study 4, we examined whether the isolated choice effect extends to real–rather
than hypothetical–decisions.
Study 4A
In Study 4A, participants were tasked with hiring graduate students to participate
in a business pitch competition. Their bonuses were contingent upon the success of the
candidate(s) they hired.
Methods
Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 310 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After excluding participants who did not follow directions
(following our preregistration plan), we were left with 271 participants (49.1% of whom
identified as men). Participants were paid $0.40, plus a potential bonus of up to $1.00, to
take a survey that took about five minutes to complete. This study was preregistered on
AsPredicted.org (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=pq3wz5).
Procedure. Participants were truthfully told that an East Coast university would
be hosting a business pitch competition. People would compete in teams, and each team
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would include three members: a team leader, a financial analyst, and a brand manager.
Each team would come up with a business idea, and judges would evaluate these business
ideas to choose a winning team.
Participants were randomly assigned to either an isolated choice or collective
choice condition. Participants in the isolated choice condition were told they would hire
one person to join a pitch competition team, and if the team that person joined won the
pitch competition, the participant would earn a $1.00 bonus. Participants in the collective
choice condition were told that they would hire all three members of a pitch competition
team, and if their team won the pitch competition, the participant would earn a $1.00
bonus. After the conclusion of the experiment, we organized and ran the pitch
competition as described, and participants were paid bonuses accordingly.
All candidates for the pitch competition team were actual graduate students at the
East Coast university where the pitch competition took place. Participants were provided
with fully truthful information about the candidates including photos, names, the number
of years they had completed in their graduate programs, and their areas of research.
Candidates for the team leader role included two white men and one white women with
comparable backgrounds. Candidates for the financial analyst and brand manager roles
were three white men. While participants in the collective choice condition hired one
person for each of the three roles, we did not assign any participants in the isolated
choice condition to make hiring decisions for the financial analyst or brand manager roles
because we were interested in whether a woman was hired for each position, and all three
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candidates for those roles were men. All study materials are available in our Online
Supplement.
Results
Our dependent variable of interest was whether the woman was hired for the team
leader role. As preregistered, we conducted a two-sample test of proportions to compare
the rate of choosing the female candidate across conditions. Consistent with our previous
studies, we found that the woman was hired significantly less often in the isolated choice
condition (20.6%) than in the collective choice condition (45.7%), z = 4.26, p < 0.001.
Study 4B
In Study 4B, participants were tasked with recommending speakers for an
academic conference, and their choices helped determine who was invited to the
conference.
Methods
Participants. We decided in advance to recruit 600 participants through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (53.5% of whom identified as men). Participants were paid
$0.45 to take a survey that took about four minutes to complete. This study was
preregistered on AsPredicted.org (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=t4qh4s).
Procedure. Participants were told that the researchers conducting this study were
organizing an upcoming academic conference. They were told that they would
recommend speakers for the conference, and the conference would include at least one
speaker from each of five focus areas: Health, Education, Conflict Management,
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Financial Literacy, and Energy. We further informed participants that their decisions
were consequential because we would invite the most frequently recommended speakers
from each focus area to the conference.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the isolated choice condition or the
collective choice condition. In the isolated choice condition, participants were tasked
with choosing one speaker from one of the focus areas chosen at random (either Health,
Education, Conflict Management, Financial Literacy or Energy). In the collective choice
condition, participants were tasked with selecting five speakers, one from each focus
area.
For each focus area, participants were asked to choose among three candidates.
These candidates were held constant across conditions. For four of the five focus areas,
the three candidates included two white men and one white woman. To obfuscate the
study’s focus on gender diversity, we included three white men as candidates for one
focus area. Because we were interested in whether a woman was selected for each
decision, participants in the isolated choice condition were never assigned to choose a
speaker in the focus area with three men as candidates, and we did not include decisions
made by participants in the collective choice condition in this focus area in our analyses
(to ensure the conditions were evenly balanced). To balance the number of hiring
decisions made across conditions, we assigned four times as many participants to the
isolated choice condition as the collective choice condition.
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Participants were provided with truthful information about all candidates
including pictures, names, academic institutions, years of academic experience, and
impact factors (their h-index on Google scholar, as of August 2019). All study materials
are available in our Online Supplement.
Results
Our dependent variable of interest was whether a woman was chosen for each
decision. In the isolated choice condition, women were chosen in 32.2% of all selection
decisions; in the collective choice condition, women were chosen in 45.8% of all
selection decisions. Following our preregistered analysis plan, we ran an ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors clustered by participant where the
dependent variable was whether a woman was chosen in each decision. The only
predictor variable was an indicator variable for being in the isolated choice condition. We
found that the effect of being in the isolated choice condition on the likelihood of
selecting a female candidate was significant and negative (bisolated_choice = -0.163, SE =
0.034, p < 0.001; 95% CI: [-0.230, -0.096]). In other words, consistent with our other
studies, making isolated choices produced less gender-diverse groups of speakers for the
conference than making sets of choices.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across six preregistered experiments, we find that the isolated choice effect
influences the gender composition of groups. We present evidence that people select less
gender-diverse candidates when making isolated hiring or selection decisions (i.e., when
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making a single hire) than when making collections of selection decisions (i.e., when
making multiple hires). We also find that diversity is less salient when people make
isolated choices than collections of choices, and salience of diversity mediates the effects
of isolated choices on personnel selection decisions. Together, our results highlight a
potentially important contributing factor to the underrepresentation of women in many
groups and organizations, given that hires are often made in isolation rather than in
collections.
All of the studies presented explore settings where women are underrepresented,
and women are hired infrequently in the isolated choices we study. In settings where men
are underrepresented, our theory predicts that hiring in collections (rather than in
isolation) should still increase the gender diversity of hired candidates, but increasing
gender diversity in these settings would mean increasing the rate of selecting male
candidates. To test this prediction, we conducted a supplemental study using the same
stimuli as Study 1 but switching the genders of all job candidates. In other words, there
were more qualified women than men available to hire for each position. We still found
that people opted for less gender diversity when making isolated choices than when
making sets of choices (see Online Supplement Study S4); however, because these
revised stimuli included an overrepresentation of qualified women, participants hired
fewer men when making isolated choices as opposed to fewer women. These results
provide support for the idea that the isolated choice effect is about diversity and not just
women.
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We chose to study the isolated choice effect in the context of gender diversity
because of its important policy implications. However, the isolated choice effect should
generalize to other contexts where group diversity is considered desirable. It would be
valuable for future research to examine how our findings extend to other social categories
(e.g., race). It would also be useful to test the effects of isolated choices on personnel
selection decisions in the field to establish the external validity of these findings. In
particular, future field work comparing hiring decisions made on separate occasions (that
are truly separated in time) with decisions made collectively would be of great value.
Examining the multiple potential motives that underlie people’s greater desire for
diversity when it is made salient would also be useful. The salience of diversity may
affect hiring decisions in multiple ways: people may believe that diversity is better for
group performance; they may believe that it is their moral obligation to pursue diversity;
or they may want to avoid appearing discriminatory. Disentangling whether all or some
of these factors drive the patterns we detect would be beneficial. Study 3B establishes
that organizational context, including explicit demands for diversity, can influence the
strength of the isolated choice effect. Future research exploring this further would be
valuable.
Past research has found that people often react negatively to explicit attempts to
increase diversity (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015; Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011;
Plant & Devine, 2001) and that it is challenging to change people’s biases and
stereotypes (Chang et al., 2019; Forscher et al., 2019; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Lai
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et al., 2016). Prompting people to make collective rather than isolated decisions is a novel
approach to increasing diversity in that it does not involve reprimands or explicit
directives (which can be viewed as overly paternalistic), nor does it rely on changing
people’s biases and stereotypes. For these reasons, it may be a particularly promising
approach to increasing diversity in organizations.
Practically, our results suggest that organizations interested in increasing diversity
might consider having decision makers hire in collective rather than isolated ways. For
example, rather than hiring one person every month, a company could hire three people
every quarter. In the long run, the company will hire the same number of people, but
choices will be made collectively (every quarter) rather than in isolation (every month).
Alternatively, companies could give certain people oversight over many hiring decisions
so at least some employees are making collective decisions, rather than allowing hiring
managers or teams make decisions in isolation.
While our work prescribes structural changes to hiring practices that are likely to
increase organizational diversity, we recognize that these prescriptions may be difficult to
implement in some contexts. It would therefore be valuable for future work to explore
ways of making isolated choices feel collective. For example, future research could
examine the effects on hiring of showing people their past hiring decisions or the
employees most recently hired by their co-workers. Such interventions could also draw
attention to diversity, which is a group-level property, and may lead to decisions that look
more like collective, rather than isolated, choices.
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CHAPTER 3. “DIVERSITY WASHING”: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT STRATEGY THAT CREATES THE
APPEARANCE OF DIVERSITY
Edward H. Chang
ABSTRACT
Extant theorizing on diversity would suggest that organizations have strong incentives to
distance themselves from diversity, given discrimination against women and racial
minorities and risks of losing status by associating with lower status groups in society.
But in recent years, there has been a marked increase in negative scrutiny applied to
organizations that are deemed to be lacking in diversity, creating strong external
incentives for organizations to attend to diversity. I propose that to resolve these
competing demands, organizations engage in “diversity washing”–whereby they mislead
outsiders about their actual diversity levels or practices–to create the appearance of caring
about diversity or being more diverse than they are in reality. I provide evidence that
organizations’ signals of their diversity are indeed distorted. For example, in multiple
organizational contexts, employees from demographically underrepresented groups are
portrayed in higher proportions in diversity signals than exist in reality in organizations.
Diversity washing seems to be exacerbated when the signals are more visible, consistent
with it being driven by impression management concerns. This work highlights the
potential strength of impression management motives in guiding diversity-related
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decisions in organizations and suggests that research on diversity should consider
impression management as a key motivation in theorizing and scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
Copious research has demonstrated that people have negative stereotypes and
biases about members of historically marginalized groups (e.g., women, racial minorities;
Fiske et al., 2002; Rosette et al., 2008). These biases can translate into discrimination
against members of these groups, as women and racial minorities often do not receive the
same opportunities to succeed in organizations as do men and White people (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2004; Kang et al., 2016; Milkman et al., 2015; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012).
As a result, many organizations and professions remain relatively homogeneous, as
women and racial minorities face barriers to entry (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004;
Moss-Racusin et al., 2012).
But in recent years, there has been a rapid increase in scrutiny on the topic of
diversity, and in particular, negative scrutiny directed at organizations that are deemed to
have inadequate diversity. For example, multiple countries have passed laws mandating
minimum levels of gender diversity on the boards of public companies in those countries
(Miller, 2014); institutional investors are placing demands on companies to add more
diversity or risk losing shareholder support (Broughton, 2019); and entire industries are
facing pressures to hire more women and underrepresented racial minorities (Marcus,
2015). This suggests that even if organizations do not want diversity, they may have
external incentives to care about diversity in order to avoid penalties and negative
attention for lacking diversity.
How do these competing demands around diversity get resolved in organizations?
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I propose that organizations may engage in “diversity washing” (i.e., greenwashing for
diversity; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Laufer, 2003) whereby they deliberately attempt to
mislead outsiders about their actual diversity levels or practices. For example, companies
could distort signals of their diversity by overrepresenting people from underrepresented
groups in externally visible settings like websites (e.g., which employees are featured on
company websites) or panels (e.g., who companies send to conferences or job fairs)
relative to their actual proportions within the companies, or companies could tout how
much they care about diversity, in spite of not being demographically diverse. Diversity
washing can help organizations resolve competing demands as they get to project an
image of diversity to appease outsiders who may scrutinize them, but they do not actually
have to be diverse in reality.
In documenting and exploring the phenomenon of diversity washing, this paper
helps provide an updated understanding of what motivates diversity-related decisions in
organizations. Prevailing theories about diversity and people’s treatment of members of
historically underrepresented groups would predict that organizations should, if anything,
distance themselves from diversity given ubiquitous bias and discrimination against
women and racial minorities. This stand in contrast to greenwashing–a phenomenon
where companies mislead consumers about their environmentally performance (Delmas
& Burbano, 2011)–as there is not much theorizing or evidence that being perceived as
environmentally friendly would be aversive to companies (cf. Kim & Lyon, 2014).
However, extant theories on diversity fail to account for the new reality of increasingly
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high external demands for diversity, which create strong impression management
incentives around diversity. More generally, incorporating impression management into
our understanding of diversity helps theorizing make more accurate predictions about
contemporary diversity-related decisions in organizations, including explaining why
phenomena like diversity washing occur.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Reasons for Organizations to Hide Diversity
Past research and theorizing provides voluminous evidence as to why
organizations may want to hide diversity within their ranks or otherwise distance
themselves from demographic diversity. For example, research has documented people’s
persistent negative biases and stereotypes about women and racial minorities (Berdahl &
Min, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002; Rosette et al., 2008; Rudman & Glick, 2001), field
experiments have shown that people discriminate against women and racial minorities in
a variety of contexts (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Milkman et al., 2015; MossRacusin et al., 2012; Neumark et al., 1996), and research has shown that people penalize
female and racial minority leaders and the organizations they lead (Brooks et al., 2014;
Heilman, 2001; Kanze et al., 2018; Rosette et al., 2008). All of this research suggests that
organizations would not want to and do not hire members of historically
underrepresented groups at the same rates as they do members of majority groups,
leading to a lack of diversity in organizations.
Even if organizations already have diversity among their ranks, they may not
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want to showcase this diversity to outsiders. Organizations typically prefer to be higher in
status rather than lower in status (Sauder et al., 2012). Given that associating with low
status others can lead to decreases in status (Podolny, 1993) and that women and racial
minorities are historically low status groups in society (Bonam et al., 2016; Castilla,
2008; Fiske et al., 2002; Levanon et al., 2009; Murphy & Oesch, 2016; Rosette et al.,
2008), organizations should try to disassociate themselves from women and racial
minorities and not embrace demographic diversity in order to preserve status. Indeed,
research has found that occupations that become increasingly female-dominated are
subsequently devalued and lose status (Levanon et al., 2009; Murphy & Oesch, 2016),
the physical spaces associated with Black Americans are negatively stereotyped and
perceived as lower in status (Bonam et al., 2016), and investors penalize companies that
appoint women to boards because these companies are perceived to be embracing
diversity (Solal & Snellman, 2019). Thus, in order to project or maintain status, it may
not be good for organizations to showcase associations with low status groups in society,
suggesting that they should not want to highlight associations with women and racial
minorities.
Beyond the discrimination that individuals from historically underrepresented
groups face, diverse teams are also subject to negative evaluator biases. People associate
diversity in teams with relationship conflict, which creates biased perceptions of the
amount of relationship conflict in diverse as opposed to homogeneous teams and lowers
people’s willingness to support diverse teams (Lount Jr et al., 2015). A recent meta123

analysis also showed that diverse teams receive lower outsider evaluations of their
performance as compared to objective performance benchmarks, suggesting that people
negatively view diverse teams (Van Dijk et al., 2012).
Finally, diversity is also threatening to majority group members in society (e.g.,
White people) and may make it harder for organizations to recruit majority group
members. Past research has found that White people find multiculturalism threatening
(Plaut et al., 2011), and White people think they will be discriminated against at
companies that espouse pro-diversity values (Dover et al., 2016). Further, reminders of
increasing racial diversity in society can lead majority racial group members to express
more negative racial attitudes and increase intergroup hostility (Craig & Richeson,
2014b, 2014a; Danbold & Huo, 2015), which can affect their willingness to join
organizations with dissimilar others. In other words, showcasing diversity may make it
harder for organizations to recruit talent in the job market, which can harm their longterm competitiveness and viability.
Together, extant research on diversity suggests many reasons why companies
might not want to showcase demographic diversity, and in fact, indicates that they have
incentives to downplay diversity. Highlighting demographic diversity in an organization
would seem to harm how others perceive it, as past research and theory would suggest
that organizations that are perceived as more diverse would be seen as lower in status,
would be evaluated more negatively, and would have a harder time recruiting people
from majority groups in society. Thus, one might make the following prediction about
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how organizations will choose to distort signals of their diversity:
Hypothesis 1: Organizations will not choose to highlight demographic diversity.
In other words, people from demographically underrepresented groups will be portrayed
in lower proportions than exist in reality in diversity signals..
Impression Management as a Motivator to Attend to Diversity
In opposition to the research documenting reasons why organizations may want to
distance themselves from diversity, there also exists research positing reasons why
organizations may want to strive for diversity. Scholars have suggested that diversity can
provide benefits to team and organizational performance, and embracing diversity can be
seen as a moral imperative given past discrimination against members of historically
underrepresented groups (Ely & Thomas, 2001). For example, correlational research
suggests that companies with higher levels of racial diversity and gender diversity
perform better (Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Hunt et al., 2015; Richard, 2000), and research
suggests that diverse groups perform better than homogeneous ones on a variety of
different dimensions (Cox et al., 1991; Gaither et al., 2017; Hoogendoorn et al., 2013;
Keck & Tang, 2017; Lount Jr & Phillips, 2007; Loyd et al., 2013; McLeod et al., 1996;
Sommers, 2006; Woolley et al., 2010). In addition, given the importance of justice and
equity in organizations (Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2013), diversity can
be seen as evidence of a fair and just process where all people have equal opportunity and
access to organizations, regardless of their social category or background.
These reasons in favor of diversity may lead organizations to be targeted for
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lacking diversity. Indeed, in recent years, negative scrutiny towards organizations that are
deemed to have inadequate diversity has dramatically increased. For example, some
countries have passed laws mandating minimum levels of gender diversity on corporate
boards of public companies (Miller, 2014; Smale & Miller, 2015); law firms have come
under intense scrutiny for announcing partner classes lacking sufficient gender and racial
diversity (Scheiber & Eligon, 2019); and Forbes magazine had to publicly acknowledge
that they “blew it” after receiving backlash for publishing a list of 100 innovative leaders
that included only one woman (McGregor, 2019).
To avoid this negative scrutiny around lacking diversity, organizations may
engage in impression management behaviors around diversity. Organizations typically
want to avoid negative scrutiny because it can have negative consequences for their
reputations (Desai, 2011). As a result, they engage in impression management around
scrutinized behaviors to try to escape critical attention (Bolino et al., 2008; Elsbach et al.,
1998). Recent research confirms that some organizations may attend to diversity for
impression management reasons to avoid negative scrutiny from sources like the media.
For example, research has found that organizations may pay lip service to diversity by
using pro-diversity language in job advertisements but not follow through on those values
in practice (Kang et al., 2016), and organizations appear to strive to reach minimum
thresholds for gender diversity on corporate boards that are perceived to help them escape
negative scrutiny (Chang, Milkman, Chugh, et al., 2019).
Beyond impression management motives to escape negative scrutiny,
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organizations could also have impression management motives to attend to diversity in
efforts to attract more diverse job candidates if they also believe in the organizational
benefits or moral imperatives of diversity (Avery & McKay, 2006). Homophily predicts
that people want to be a part of groups and organizations that are composed of people
who look like them (McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987; McPherson et al., 2001). If an
organization lacks people from a particular demographic category and believes that
homophily will attract people from that demographic category, the organization may
distort signals about its diversity levels and overrepresent people from that demographic
category. Past research provides some evidence that portraying an image of people from
particular demographic categories may be an effective strategy for attracting people from
those demographic categories. For example, people from marginalized racial groups in
the United States tend to be attracted to organizations that represent them (e.g., when a
company's website depicts Black employees and managers, Black people are more
attracted to that company; Avery, 2003; Avery, Hernandez, & Hebl, 2004), and past
research has found that diversity cues are important for attracting members of racial
minorities (Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008).
As a result of these motivations to attend to diversity for impression management
reasons, organizations may engage in “diversity washing”–or attempts to create an image
of having a diverse workforce–as a way to avoid negative scrutiny and/or increase
workforce diversity. For both motivations, organizations should want to distort diversity
signals in ways that depict people from demographically underrepresented groups in
127

higher proportions than exist in reality (e.g., portraying the organization as having more
Black employees than the organization has in reality if Black employees are
underrepresented in the organization relative to society), as these strategies should project
an image of being more diverse. If we believe these impression management motives are
strong enough, then we might make the following prediction about how organizations
will distort signals of their diversity:
Hypothesis 2: Organizations will engage in “diversity washing.” In other words,
people from demographically underrepresented groups will be portrayed in higher
proportions than exist in reality in diversity signals.
Moderating Effects of Visibility
If it is true that organizations engage in diversity washing (as opposed to
downplaying diversity), then we might expect diversity washing behavior to be
moderated by the visibility of the group or organization. Visibility refers to how much
attention groups or organizations receive, regardless of reason (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011).
When organizations are more visible, they tend to face greater external pressures and
therefore have greater incentives to attend to impression management behaviors of all
sorts (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), including diversity
washing. For example, past research has shown that more visible organizations are more
likely to conform to social norms around diversity behaviors for impression management
reasons (Chang, Milkman, Chugh, et al., 2019), and that organizations that are more
visible engage in more prosocial actions for impression management reasons after being
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the target of social movement boycotts (McDonnell & King, 2013).
As a result, increased visibility should mean that organizations are more likely to
engage in diversity washing as compared to less visible groups or organizations.
Increased visibility translates to greater scrutiny and greater pressures to engage in
impression management behaviors like diversity washing, and failing to meet
expectations around issues like diversity can lead to greater punishments highly visible
firms. Thus, assuming diversity washing occurs, then we might make the following
prediction about the circumstances that would exacerbate the behavior:
Hypothesis 3: Increased visibility will lead to increased diversity washing.
Overview of Studies
In Studies 1 and 2, I test whether members of demographically underrepresented
groups are portrayed in systematically higher or lower proportions than exist in reality in
signals of organizational diversity. In Study 1, I examine diversity signals of technology
companies, and in Study 2, I examine diversity signals of law firms. In both contexts, I do
not find evidence that organizations downplay diversity; in fact, I find evidence of
diversity washing, whereby employees from demographically underrepresented groups–
namely Black people and women–are portrayed in systematically higher proportions on
technology company and law firm websites than exist in reality. In Study 3, I
experimentally manipulate visibility to see if increased visibility exacerbates diversity
washing, as would be predicted by an impression management account. Finally, in Study
4, I experimentally manipulate visibility using a different paradigm, again to see if
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increased visibility exacerbates diversity washing.
STUDY 1: DIVERSITY SIGNALS ON TECHNOLOGY COMPANY WEBSITES
In Study 1, I analyzed data from EEO-1 reports and company job or career
websites to test whether diversity is downplayed or whether diversity washing occurs on
the job or career websites of technology companies. I compared demographic
compositions of employees featured on websites to demographic compositions of actual
employees at these companies to see whether there are systematic distortions of
proportions of employees from demographically underrepresented groups.
Methods
Data. The EEO-1 data I used were compiled by the Center for Investigative
Reporting (Evans & Rangarajan, 2017). The Center for Investigative Reporting sought to
obtain EEO-1 reports for 2016 from 211 of the largest technology companies in the San
Francisco Bay Area. They compiled the list of 211 companies by taking the top 150
publicly traded technology companies as ranked by worldwide annual revenue and
including 61 private companies that had valuations of at least $1 billion, as estimated by
Crunchbase and CB Insights. Twenty-two companies released EEO-1 report data to
Reveal, and I used all of these data in my analyses.
EEO-1 reports are mandatory government reports for companies with 100
employees or more (EEO-1: Answers to Filing Questions Often Asked by Employers,
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n.d.). They include data on the racial and gender composition22 of all employees at a
company, broken down by job category (e.g., executive/senior officials and managers). I
paired these EEO-1 data with data collected from these same companies’ job or career
websites. For each company, I had a mixed-race and mixed-gender group of research
assistants go to the homepage of the company and navigate to find the landing page for
their job or career website. The research assistants then worked together as a group to
code the race and gender of all employees depicted on the job or career website using the
same categories used in the EEO-1 reports. While there are undoubtedly issues with the
methodology of categorizing people based on appearance rather than asking for selfidentified racial and gender identity, past research suggests that people can accurately
identify the self-identified race of the subject of a photograph with high accuracy
(Blascovich et al., 1997; Chance & Goldstein, 1981). In addition, given the focus of the
study on signals of diversity, perceived racial and gender categories may be more
important than self-identified racial and gender categories.
Analysis Strategy. To test whether and how signals of diversity are distorted on
company websites, I compared the demographic compositions of the employees depicted
on their job or career websites to the demographic compositions of their employees as
reported to the federal government via EEO-1 reports. Specifically, I used Monte Carlo
simulations to generate null distributions under the assumption that employees were
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Gender is categorized as male or female. Race is categorized as American Indian or
Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Native Hawaiian
or Other Pacific Islander, Two or More Races, or White.
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chosen at random to be depicted on the job or career website of a company. Thus, for
each company and each demographic category (e.g., Black people at Apple), I calculated
how likely or unlikely it was (i.e., with p-values) that that proportion of people from a
given demographic category (or a more extreme proportion) would appear on the job or
career website of the company if the company were selecting from its employees at
random.
Beyond calculating these likelihoods for individual companies and demographic
categories, I also considered all 22 companies simultaneously to see whether people from
certain demographic categories were systematically overrepresented or underrepresented
as a whole across companies. Using techniques from meta-analysis, I combined p-values
across companies to test the probability of seeing these levels of distortions (or more
extreme levels) across companies, assuming the null hypothesis that companies randomly
selected employees for their websites.
Results
Summary Statistics. The companies in my dataset varied greatly in size, with the
smallest company (23andMe) having 297 employees and the largest (Apple) having
77,192 employees. On average, these companies were composed of 29.8% Asian
Americans, 4.0% Black or African Americans, 5.8% Hispanic or Latinx Americans, and
57.5% White Americans. On average, 33.4% of employees at these companies were
women.
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The companies also varied in terms of the number of employees they depicted on
their job or career websites, ranging from one employee (View) to 44 employees
(Twitter), with an average of 16.9 employees depicted. On average, of the employees
depicted on these websites, 31.7% were Asian Americans, 14.1% were Black or African
Americans, 3.6% were Hispanic or Latinx Americans, and 48.5% were White Americans.
On average, 47.9% of the employees depicted on these websites were women. These
summary statistics alone suggests some degree of distortion of diversity signals.
How Are Signals of Diversity Distorted for Technology Companies? In contrast
to Hypothesis 1 (which states that companies will downplay diversity) and consistent
with Hypothesis 2 (which states that companies will engage in diversity washing), Black
people and women of all races were portrayed in systematically higher proportions on
technology company job or career websites relative to their proportions among
employees at these companies. Sixteen out of 22 companies (72.7%) had a higher
proportion of Black employees on their job or career websites relative to their actual
proportion among their employees (overall probability across companies: p < 0.001; see
Figure 1), and 18 out of 22 companies (81.8%) had a higher proportion of women
(overall probability across companies: p < 0.001; see Figure 2).
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------------------------------------------133

Insert Figure 2 about here
-----------------------------------STUDY 2: DIVERSITY SIGNALS ON LAW FIRM WEBSITES
In Study 2, I replicated the analyses of technology companies in a different
organizational context–law firms. I compared data from the Law Firm Diversity Survey
distributed by Vault and the Minority Corporate Counsel Association about attorney
demographics at different law firms with data taken from their job or career websites to
see whether and how diversity signals of law firms are distorted.
Methods
Data. I examined the largest 150 law firms in the United States according to
PublicLegal as of 2019. I combined this list of law firms with the 2020 Vault Law 100, a
national ranking of the most prestigious law firms based on the assessments of lawyers at
peer firms. Given that there was significant overlap between these two lists, these two
lists gave me a total of 162 firms.
For each of these firms, I searched the Law Firm Diversity Survey database to see
if the firm had a corresponding survey response in 2019. These surveys report the
demographics of attorneys at law firms broken down by job title, gender, and race.23 I
aggregated attorney demographics by summing the categories “Associate”, “Equity
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Gender is categorized as man or woman. Race is categorized as White/Caucasian,
African-American/Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Alaska Native/American Indian, Asian,
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or Multiracial.
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Partner”, “Non-Equity Partner”, and “Of Counsel.” 142 of the 162 law firms had
submitted a survey response in 2019.
I paired these demographic data with data collected from these same law firms’
job or career websites using the same methodology as in Study 1 of coding the gender
and race of employees featured on the career websites of these law firms. Unlike the
technology companies in Study 1, many law firms do not depict any employees on their
websites, leaving a final sample of 95 law firms (i.e., law firms that both featured at least
one person on their website and submitted a survey response in 2019).24
Results
Summary Statistics. The law firms in my dataset ranged from 147 attorneys to
2,116 attorneys. On average, attorneys were 8.2% Asian, 3.4% Black, 4.1%
Hispanic/Latinx, and 82.0% White at these law firms. On average, 36.7% of attorneys at
these law firms were women.
The law firms also varied in terms of the number of employees they depict on
their job or career websites, ranging from one employee to 26 employees, with an
average of 6.4 employees depicted. On average, of the employees depicted on these
websites, 14.3% were Asian, 17.6% were Black, 4.3% were Latinx, and 61.7% were
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Whether a law firm chooses to depict employees on its website does not appear related
to observable firm characteristics like status or size, but it is negative correlated with
gender diversity. In other words, law firms with higher proportions of female attorneys
are less likely to depict any employees on their websites (p = 0.038).
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White. On average, 53.9% of the employees depicted on these websites were women.
These summary statistics again suggests some degree of distortion of diversity signals.
How Are Signals of Diversity Distorted for Law Firms? I used the same Monte
Carlo simulation method as in Study 1 to see whether signals of diversity are distorted on
law firm websites. Failing to support Hypothesis 1 and providing additional support for
Hypothesis 2, which states that companies will engage in diversity washing, Black people
and women of all races were systematically portrayed in higher proportions on law firm
job or career websites relative to their actual proportions among employees at these
companies. Sixty out of 95 companies (63.2%) had a higher proportion of Black
employees on their job or career websites relative to their actual proportion among their
employees (overall probability across companies: p < 0.001), and 71 out of 95 companies
(74.7%) had a higher proportion of women of all races (overall probability across
companies: p < 0.001).
Discussion of Studies 1 and 2
In Studies 1 and 2, I tested whether and how companies distort signals of their
diversity. While much of past research on diversity would predict that organizations
should, if anything, downplay signals of their demographic diversity (Hypothesis 1), I
find no evidence of this. On the contrary, I find evidence that members of
demographically underrepresented groups were portrayed in systematically higher
proportions on technology company and law firm websites than exist in actuality among
their employees, a phenomenon I label “diversity washing.” These results are consistent
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with Hypothesis 2, which states that impression management motives surrounding
diversity will lead companies to portray higher proportions of members of
demographically underrepresented groups in signals of diversity than they have in reality.
Both technology and law are industries where demographic diversity is lacking
relative to the overall U.S. population. For example, in spite of Black people composing
roughly 13% of the U.S. population and women composing roughly 50% of the
population (US Census: Quick Facts, 2016), on average, only 4.0% and 3.4% of
technology and law firm employees were Black, respectively, in the companies in my
dataset, while only 33.4% and 36.7% of employees were women. The fact that these
industries are relatively homogeneous compared to the overall U.S. population could
contribute to why these companies engage in diversity washing as opposed to
downplaying their diversity. As a result, it is unclear whether these findings would
generalize to industries or companies that have higher proportions of demographic
diversity, much less industries or companies with higher levels of demographic diversity
than the overall U.S. population.
STUDY 3: INCREASED VISIBILITY EXACERBATES DIVERSITY WASHING
IN AN EXPERIMENT
Having established diversity washing as a phenomenon in at least two
organizational contexts, in Study 3, I sought to test whether diversity washing becomes
more severe as the visibility of a group increases, as would be suggested by impression
management motives. To test this, I ran an online experiment where I tested people’s
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preferences for diversity for an externally visible group (e.g., the employees featured in a
newsletter sent to external stakeholders) versus an internal group (e.g., the employees
featured in a newsletter sent to internal stakeholders). First, diversity washing predicts
that people should be more likely to choose Black employees and women for either group
relative to their base rate availability (i.e., people will overrepresent Black employees and
women; Hypothesis 2). Second, people should be more likely to choose Black employees
and women for the externally visible group than the internal group (i.e., increasing
visibility increases diversity washing; Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants. Four hundred and two participants in the U.S. were recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in a short online research study (57.0%
identified as men). These participants were paid $0.35 for completing a survey they were
told would take 2-3 minutes of their time. This study was preregistered on
AsPredicted.org (http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=x4ge6q).
Procedures. Participants were asked to imagine they worked for a small
technology company of roughly twenty employees. They were then shown pictures of
twenty faces taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015). The twenty faces
were composed of one Black man, one Latinx man, four Asian men, two Asian women,
eight White men, and four White women, as these proportions roughly reflect the average
demographic compositions of the technology companies in my sample in Study 1. The
Chicago Face Database provides data on how often people categorize each face as male
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or female and as Asian, Black, Latinx, White, Multiracial, or Other. I only selected faces
where pretests had shown that people had at least 90% accuracy in categorizing gender
and at least 90% accuracy in categorizing race (e.g., for the Latinx man, over 90% of
people correctly identified him as a man, and over 90% of people correctly identified him
as Latinx). I also stimulus sampled the faces to ensure the results were not driven by the
particular faces chosen.
To manipulate visibility, participants were randomly assigned to either the
externally visible group condition or the internal group condition. In the externally
visible group condition, participants were told they were tasked with choosing five
employees to feature in a newsletter that would be sent to all shareholders of the
company (i.e., a group of external stakeholders where impression management concerns
may apply). In the internal group condition, participants were told they were tasked with
choosing five employees to feature in a newsletter that would be sent to all employees of
the company (i.e., a group of internal stakeholders where impression management
concerns should be less likely to apply since all employees presumably already know the
underlying actual diversity of the company). Participants then chose five employees to
feature in the newsletter.
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants were asked to what extent they
agreed with the statement, “The group of employees I chose for the newsletter will be
scrutinized by the public or media,” on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly
Agree).
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Results and Discussion
First, I tested whether people chose the Black and women employees for the
groups significantly more often than would be expected by chance, as would be predicted
by diversity washing (Hypothesis 2). If people were choosing employees at random, 5%
of the employees chosen for the groups should be Black (since 1 out of 20 of the
employees was Black), while 30% of the employees chosen should be women (since 6
out of 20 of the employees were women). Across conditions, 14.8% of the employees
chosen were Black, which was significantly greater than expected, t(401) = 22.28, p <
0.001, and 39.7% of the employees chosen were women, again significantly greater than
expected, t(401) = 15.12, p < 0.001. These results are consistent with the results from
Studies 1 and 2 and with Hypothesis 2, which states that people will portray higher
proportions of members of demographically underrepresented groups in diversity signals
than they have in reality.
Second, I tested whether manipulating visibility exacerbated the extent of
diversity washing. The manipulation check showed that people felt that the group would
be under greater scrutiny in the externally visible group condition (M = 4.86, SD = 2.05)
as compared to the internal group condition (M = 2.18, SD = 1.61), t(400) = 14.6, p <
0.001, suggesting that I successfully manipulated visibility and thus impression
management concerns. Next, the Black employee represented 15.8% of group members
chosen in the externally visible group condition and only 13.8% of groups members in
the internal group condition, t(400) = 2.34, p = 0.020, d = 0.23. Put another way, 79.0%
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of participants chose to include the Black employee in their group in the externally visible
group condition, while only 68.8% of participants chose to include the Black employee in
their group in the internal group condition. In other words, increasing the visibility of the
group increased the rate at which people engaged in diversity washing of Black people,
consistent with Hypothesis 3.
With regards to diversity washing of women, women represented 39.6% of group
members chosen in the externally visible group condition and 39.8% of group members
chosen in the internal group condition, t(400) = 0.157, p = 0.875. In this case, increasing
visibility did not exacerbate the diversity washing of women, failing to provide additional
support for Hypothesis 3.
STUDY 4: MANIPULATING VISIBILITY USING A DIFFERENT PARADIGM
In Study 4, I again sought to test whether diversity washing becomes more severe
as the visibility of a group increases, but I used a different paradigm to manipulate
visibility and different stimuli. In this study, I manipulated visibility of a chosen group by
telling participants that the photos and names of group members would be featured on a
website or that the photos and names of group members would not be featured on a
website. Diversity washing predicts that people should be more likely to choose Black
people and women for either group relative to their base rate availability (Hypothesis 2).
In addition, people should be more likely to choose Black people and women when group
members’ photos and names are featured on a website than when group members’ photos
and names are not featured (Hypothesis 3).
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Method
Participants. Four hundred U.S. participants were recruited on Prolific to
participate in a short online research study (40.0% identified as men). These participants
were paid $0.35 for completing a survey they were told would take 2-3 minutes of their
time. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=xf9f9c).
Procedures. Participants were told that a research center was looking to highlight
on its website some of the research that scientists affiliated with the center were doing.
They were told the website would feature four stories from scientists and that we were
looking for input on who should be featured. To manipulate visibility, participants were
randomly assigned to either the identifiable information condition or the anonymous
condition. In the identifiable information condition, participants were told that each story
from a scientist would be accompanied by that scientist’s name and photo. In the
anonymous condition, participants were told that each story from a scientist would not
have a name or photo accompany it. If participants were worried about diversity for
impression management reasons, these concerns should have been more salient in the
identifiable information condition, as the (lack of) demographic diversity of the stories on
the website would be more visible than in the anonymous condition.
Participants were then shown pictures, names, and areas of research (e.g.,
education) of twelve real social scientists affiliated with an actual research center. The
twelve scientists were composed of one Black man, one Asian man, six White men, one
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Asian woman, and three White women. Participants then chose four of these scientists to
recommend be featured on the website.
Results and Discussion
First, I tested whether participants chose the Black and women scientists to be
featured on the website significantly more often than would be expected by chance, as
would be predicted by diversity washing (Hypothesis 2). If participants were choosing
scientists at random, 8.33% of the scientists chosen for the website should be Black
(since 1 out of 12 of the scientists was Black), while 33.33% of the scientists chosen
should be women (since 4 out of 12 of the scientists were women). Across conditions,
10.6% of the scientists chosen were Black, which was significantly greater than expected,
t(399) = 3.61, p < 0.001, and 39.6% of the scientists chosen were women, again
significantly greater than expected, t(399) = 6.72, p < 0.001. These results provide
support for Hypothesis 2, which states that people will portray higher proportions of
members of demographically underrepresented groups in diversity signals than exist in
reality.
Second, I tested whether manipulating visibility exacerbated the extent of
diversity washing. The Black scientist represented 11.7% of group members chosen in
the identifiable information condition and only 9.5% of groups members in the
anonymous condition. This difference in rates of diversity washing between conditions
was in the expected direction, but it was only marginally significant, t(398) = 1.83, p =
0.0675. Similarly, women represented 41.2% of group members chosen in the
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identifiable information condition and only 38.0% of groups members in the anonymous
condition. Again, this difference was in the expected direction, but it was only marginally
significant, t(398) = 1.76, p = 0.0795. These results provide marginal support that
increasing visibility exacerbates diversity washing (Hypothesis 3).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper, I document the phenomenon of diversity washing. In multiple
organizational contexts and in experiments, I find evidence that Black people and women
of all races are systematically overrepresented in diversity signals, such that they appear
in higher proportions than actually exist in organizations. Diversity washing occurs in
spite of copious past research on diversity which would suggest that organizations should
be wary of showcasing diversity. Organizations may be driven to diversity wash for
impression management reasons, as there now exist external incentives for companies to
attend to diversity to avoid negative scrutiny. I also find some evidence that diversity
washing is exacerbated by higher visibility, consistent with past research showing that
visibility leads to higher incentives to engage in impression management (Chang,
Milkman, Chugh, et al., 2019; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; McDonnell & King, 2013).
This work contributes to the relatively limited literature examining the importance
of impression management as a motivator of diversity-related decisions and behaviors.
Past research has documented how impression management motives may shape how
individuals react in interracial settings (Apfelbaum et al., 2008) and may influence
diversity-related hiring decisions (Chang, Milkman, Chugh, et al., 2019). But the
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distortions of diversity signals due to diversity washing I document can be completely
detached from actual diversity levels within companies, which distinguishes diversity
washing from actual changes in diversity-related hiring decisions documented in past
research (Chang, Milkman, Chugh, et al., 2019). Diversity washing should instead be
seen as a form of organizational decoupling akin to greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano,
2011; Laufer, 2003), where an organization’s behaviors do not align with what it says
about its behaviors (in the case of greenwashing, with regards to its environmental record
or performance). Contrary to greenwashing, which assumes that the only real risks to
greenwashing for organizations are if the deception is discovered (cf. Kim & Lyon,
2014), diversity washing represents a much more risky proposition to organizations,
given theory and research which suggests that associating with diversity can damage an
organization’s standing (in addition to the risk of the deception being discovered). Thus,
diversity washing represents a more extreme phenomenon in which impression
management concerns may dominate other motives and suggests that impression
management should be considered as a primary motivator of attention to diversity in
organizations.
While I document systematic overrepresentations of members of certain
demographically underrepresented groups (e.g., Black people, women of all races) across
companies, the analysis strategy I use does not allow me to disentangle the motivations of
any individual company. The results I find are consistent with impression management
motives surrounding diversity, but they may not actually reflect strategic or deliberate
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decision making. For example, people may have heuristics that they should choose to
represent at least one person from every demographic group in external signals of
diversity, similar to how some investors use naïve diversification strategies and invest in
equal amounts across all funds offered by their retirement plans (Benartzi & Thaler,
2001). If people and organizations were using such a heuristic, we might also expect to
see overrepresentation of Latinx employees in diversity signals, given that Latinx people
represent the largest minority group in the U.S. and are underrepresented in both
technology companies and law firms relative to the general U.S. population. However, I
find no evidence of overrepresentation of Latinx people in any of my studies.
If the diversity washing I document is driven by impression management,
questions remain as to whether diversity washing is driven primarily by desires to avoid
negative scrutiny or by desires to attract a more diverse workforce. If organizations are
engaging in diversity washing to attract diversity, however, it may be a bad strategy. Past
research has found that diversity statements–when they are found not to be backed up by
action–can actually decrease organizational attraction among job candidates because
people dislike inauthenticity (Windscheid et al., 2016). In addition, diversity washing
may inflate perceptions of organizational dishonesty around diversity, which can make
organizations less attractive to racial minorities (Wilton et al., 2019). In other words,
organizations may be engaging in an impression mismanagement strategy (Steinmetz et
al., 2017) if they diversity wash as a means to increase their attraction to women and
racial minorities.
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An important limitation of the organizational contexts I examine empirically (i.e.,
technology companies and law firms) is they are contexts in which women and racial
minorities are underrepresented relative to the general population. Organizations may feel
pressure to portray themselves as having diversity that reflects the general population
(Ely & Thomas, 2001), which may drive diversity washing in organizations where
women and racial minorities are underrepresented relative to the general population, but
not in organizations where women and racial minorities are proportionally represented or
overrepresented. Future work should examine how organizations behave in contexts
where women and racial minorities are proportionally represented or overrepresented
relative to the general population. In these contexts, organizations may have other
impression management strategies around diversity and may not engage in diversity
washing.
Technology and law are also industries that are high status overall (e.g., white
collar work; typically high paying). Higher status firms may face greater pressures to
diversity wash for a variety of reasons. First, higher status firms are typically more visible
than lower status firms (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; McDonnell & King, 2013), which
would suggest that they have greater incentives to engage in impression management
behaviors like diversity washing. Second, people typically have higher expectations for
the behaviors of higher status firms (McDonnell & King, 2018; Rhee & Haunschild,
2006). To the extent that diversity is seen as an expectation of firms, higher status firms
should also be more wary of failing to diversity wash given that they face greater
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penalties for failing to meet higher expectations (McDonnell & King, 2018; Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006). Future research should explore how impression management
behaviors around diversity play out in lower status firms and industries.
In addition, in my experiments, I find only limited evidence that experimentally
manipulating visibility increases diversity washing. In part, this may be driven by the fact
that even in the less visible conditions, participants may have strong impression
management or social desirability concerns around diversity, as they may worry about
appearing sexist or racist to experimenters even in anonymous surveys (Apfelbaum et al.,
2008; Kawakami et al., 2009). This is evidenced by the large amounts of diversity
washing that participants exhibit in these less visible conditions, suggesting that there
may not be much further room to push people’s impression management concerns and
thus their diversity washing behaviors in artificial online experiments.
More generally, in augmenting our understanding of what drives diversity-related
decisions in organizations, this work potentially provides guidance about how we might
increase diversity in organizations. Much of past research on interventions to increase
diversity in organizations has focused on attempting to change people’s biases and
stereotypes (e.g., through diversity training). Unfortunately, past research has shown that
many of these interventions are not particularly successful (Chang, Milkman, Gromet, et
al., 2019; Kalev et al., 2006; Lai et al., 2016). In highlighting the role of impression
management, this work illuminates other factors and motivations that may influence
diversity-related decisions in organizations. Ways to make impression management
148

concerns around diversity more salient in hiring decisions may thus be a fruitful way to
increase diversity in selection decisions.
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FIGURES
Figure 1
Comparison of Actual Proportion of Black Employees on Job or Career Websites to
Expected Proportion Based on Employee Demographics
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Figure 2
Comparison of Actual Proportion of Women on Job or Career Websites to Expected
Proportion Based on Employee Demographics
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